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 Why do some people support redistribution from the rich to the poor while others 
do not? A very large literature centers on this question, and the list of possible answers 
researchers have offered is both long and, occasionally, contradictory. For instance, while 
certain scholars posit that a Hobbesian sense of self-interest motivates individuals to 
oppose redistribution, other researchers argue that empathy for those in need encourage 
individuals to support systems of welfare redistribution. Building on the work of social 
and political psychologists, I argue that perceptions of group identity are central to 
determining when, or among whom, self-interest is of primary concern and when, or 
among whom, empathy leads to higher support for welfare redistribution. Using a variety 
of existing national and cross-national surveys and a set of original, small-n survey 
experiments, I find that among individuals who perceive that they share no commonality 
with the poor, support for redistribution largely is a function of self-interest. Yet, when 
individuals perceive that they share much in common with the poor, feelings of empathy 
are more likely to form and self-interest matters less.   
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Chapter 1 
Inequality and Support for Economic Redistribution 
  
 The topic of economic inequality recently has come quite into vogue both within 
the academe and among politicians, and for good reason. Economic inequality is linked 
to a number of economic and social ills. On the economic front, inequality within a 
nation leads to inferior economic growth (Alesina & Rodrik 1994; Mo 2000) and 
weakens human capital that is fundamental to economic prosperity (Castelló & 
Doménech 2002). Although these costs are high, they are also controversial. For balance: 
Depending on econometric techniques, other scholars have found that inequality is good 
for economic growth (Forbes 2000), and others have identified additional economic 
benefits of inequality, such as the diversification of the labor market (Welch 1999).  
 What is far less controversial, however, are inequality’s social costs. Higher 
economic inequality has been linked to higher rates of human mortality (Wilkinson 
2006), environmental degradation (Mikkelson et al. 2007), violent crime (Fajnzylber et 
al. 2002), and political instability (Alesina & Perotti 1996). Inequality has also been 
linked to a wide range of disparities in citizens’ health and education (Lynch et al. 2000; 
Neckerman & Torche 2007; Wilkinson & Pickett 2010). On a general and larger scale, 
research has demonstrated that economic inequality is bad for democracy (Bartels 2008). 
Indeed, scholars of regime change have identified high levels of inequality as an obstacle 
to democratization and democratic consolidation (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003; 
Acemoglu & Robinson 2009).  
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 Poor health, environmental problems, crime, and democratic instability speak 
directly to a nation’s economic and national security interests, and in perhaps a rare 
instance of convergence between academe and public discourse, President Barack Obama 
declared inequality “a fundamental threat to the American Dream, our way of life and 
what we stand for around the globe” (Goldfarb 2014), and it was no less noteworthy 
when the Chairwoman of the United States Federal Reserve announced that “The extent 
of and continuing increase in inequality in the United States greatly concern me” (Yellen 
2014).1    
 Tackling inequality, naturally, is no easy task. The distribution of resources, 
however defined, determines who has power and who does not. It is thus unsurprising 
that the redistribution of resources—namely, of wealth or income—is a pervasive and 
contentious political issue in both post-industrialized and developing countries. Although 
economic redistribution from the rich to the poor ameliorates the effects of poverty 
(Dagdeviren et al. 2002) and might even help ensure the survival of democratic regimes 
(Karl 2000), it remains a contested practice nearly everywhere it occurs. It is also a 
practice whose quality and survival depend in no small part on a reservoir of public 
support (Brooks & Manza 2006).  
 These considerations have spurred an encompassing research agenda that explores 
why some citizens support economic redistribution from the rich to the poor, while others 
do not. If inequality is to be reduced—and democracy protected, redistribution will 
necessitate more than a modicum of public support. Unfortunately, our knowledge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Advocates for reducing economic inequality, however, were disappointed when Obama 
replaced discussions about inequality with those about the middle class as the 2014 
midterm elections neared. 
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why people support redistribution is far from systemized. The laundry list of factors that 
scholars have identified as leading to, or inhibiting, public support for welfare is both 
staggering and bewildering. Existing theoretical and empirical work paradoxically 
suggests that both self-interest and factors related to compassion—be that in the form of 
group solidarity, empathy, or values—motivate people’s attitudes toward redistribution. 
Yet few works delve deeper by questioning how this could possibly be the case.  
 It would appear that the literature is divided starkly into two camps: One that 
emphasizes the centrality of Hobbesian self-interest, where citizens are loath for 
government tax officials to expropriate their hard-earned money for the betterment of 
society’s economic losers, and another that centers on human beings’ capacity for 
solidarity and altruism, which encourages willingness to support the downtrodden and 
those down on their luck. Proponents of opposite sides of the literature rarely engage with 
one another, which is problematic insofar as simple common sense reveals the possibility 
that people—even the same people—can be motivated by self-interest or altruism in 
different situations or, potentially, simultaneously. The purpose of this study is to bridge 
this divide, which I intend to do by providing answers to two primary questions. First, 
when, or among whom, is self-interest a strong determinant of attitudes toward 
redistribution? Second, when, or among whom, do non-self-interested concerns, such as 
empathy and values, emerge to influence these attitudes?  
 The answers to these questions potentially have wide-ranging implications for 
how pro-welfare policymakers and activists frame their messages to induce support for 
redistribution among the general public. This is a particularly prescient concern, 
considering ever-growing economic inequality within capitalist democracies (Picketty 
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2014). When self-interest is paramount, for instance, messages that tout the economic 
benefits of redistribution and downplay the personal costs on those who contribute 
through higher taxes will be vital to sustaining this support. These cost-benefit frames 
will be unnecessary, however, when messages that draw on citizens’ empathy and values 
can be used more successfully to spark support. Tailoring messages to specific types of 
people in specific contexts is key to bolstering public support for redistribution—or, 
inversely, to decimating this support. 
 I argue that whether self-interested or compassionate concerns affect support for 
redistribution is a function of individuals’ perceptions that they share commonalities with 
welfare recipients. In brief, I hypothesize and find evidence to support the argument that 
self-interest most strongly influences redistributive attitudes in the absence of perceptions 
of commonality. When these perceptions do exist, less self-interested factors, such as 
empathy, deservingness, and values take hold. Moreover, I argue and demonstrate that 
not only is self-interest’s ability to influence public attitudes about redistribution curtailed 
by individuals’ perceptions of commonality with the poor, but so too is self-interest’s 
direct relationship with partisanship. Economic redistribution is a key political issue in 
politics throughout the world—especially within industrialized democratic states—and 
we should expect that voters’ party loyalties are shaped by, or at least correlated with, 
their redistributional preferences. In fact, a broad literature on economic voting, which I 
discuss in greater depth in Chapter Five, is predicated on this argument. But, as I show, 
the identical forces that motivate people to support redistribution to the poor in spite of 
their self-interest also motivate people to support parties that favor redistribution, even 
when this is not predicted by self-interest-centered theories of economic voting. Thus, not 
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only do perceptions of commonality influence self-interest’s and altruism’s influences on 
people’s attitudes about redistribution, but these perceptions potentially also mitigate the 
relationship between self-interest and the most fundamental and democratic of all 
political behaviors: Voting. 
 In addition to having implications for how opinion makers can (or already do) 
influence public preferences for redistribution and voting behavior, this study also helps 
tidy up a rather unwieldy and, at times, contradictory literature by tying together three of 
its most entrenched strands. As I detail in a following section, the literature that examines 
the underpinnings of public support for redistribution falls generally into three camps. In 
the first, and perhaps oldest, research has focused on the centrality of self-interest. Simply 
put, the higher one’s income, the less like one is to support redistribution. The second 
camp, however, finds that group solidarity—or, in many cases, the lack thereof—is 
strongly determinate of welfare preferences. In these accounts, race, ethnicity, and social 
diversity are of primary relevance. Lastly, researchers have looked at an array of other 
factors—such as empathy, values, and perceptions of deservingness—that tap into 
people’s compassion for welfare recipients as opposed to their self-interest.  
 By linking these three strands of the literature, this study contributes not by 
adding new factors to the list, but by explicating how well-established factors work, or 
interact, with each other. More importantly, by showing how perceptions of commonality 
condition the extent to which self-interest and empathy-based appeals influence public 
attitudes, this study seeks to enable policymakers to craft sustainable programs of 
redistribution to tackle the inequality that threatens not only vital national interests, but 
threatens also democracy itself. 
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A Note on Redistribution 
 
 Before delving into the literature on public support for redistribution, it is 
necessary to clarify the term “redistribution” as it will be used throughout this study.2 I 
employ the term “redistribution” to capture movement of wealth or income from 
society’s richer members to its poorest. Naturally, redistribution can also flow from the 
poor to the rich—in fact this is the more typical direction of redistribution in the United 
States today (Reich 2014)—and a variety of programs and policies can be, and are, used 
to redistribute income and/or wealth. The arguments I present are generalizable both to 
attitudes about redistribution from rich to poor generally and to attitudes toward specific 
redistributive programs. As such, some of the measures used in later chapters will 
examine both general attitudes toward redistribution (e.g. to what extent do you support 
the government redistributing income from the rich to the poor?) and more specific 
attitudes (e.g. to what extent do you support contributing assistance to the unemployed?). 
Furthermore, the arguments I advance are applicable to people’s attitudes toward 
reducing both income and wealth inequalities, the import of the latter being often 
minimized or overlooked by economists and political scientists (Sen 1999; Picketty 
2014). Throughout the study, I use the terms redistribution and welfare interchangeably 
to avoid tedious repetition, even though the latter term might conjure images of specific 
types of redistributive schemes.  
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Later chapters will define the terms self-interest, empathy, values, identity, etcetera. 
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A Vast Literature 
 
 Traditionally, economists and political scientists believed that one’s support for 
social welfare provisions was a direct—and rational—function of socio-economic status; 
that is, of self-interest. The poor call for redistribution, the rich oppose. Taking the 
argument to its logical conclusion, Meltzer and Richard argue that the median voter’s 
income determines the amount of government spending on social programs in 
democracies that operate under majority rule, writing that “the voter with median income 
among the enfranchised citizens is decisive. Voters with income below the income of the 
decisive voter choose candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution; voters 
with income above the decisive voter desire lower taxes and less redistribution” (1981, p. 
924). Thus, not only does self-interest affect opinions on redistribution, the self-interest 
of citizens—particularly the self-interest of the illustrious median voter—directly 
determines the size and scope of the democratic state. 
 The Meltzer-Richard model remains influential in political economy, although 
scholars in the interim have taken welfare’s insurance aspects into consideration (Moene 
& Wallerstein 2001; Iverson & Soskice 2001; Iverson 2005; Rehm 2005; Barber et al. 
2013). This refinement allows that the rich will support social protection in the form of 
insurance in line with their exposure to labor market risks (Iverson 2005). Accordingly, 
the theorist need not abandon the parsimonious logic of self-interest simply because a 
number of citizens with above-median income support redistribution. From this literature, 
we can draw the conclusion that the poor will always favor welfare programs, whereas 
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the rich will oppose it, unless they have reason to believe they are personally at risk and 
may need help at a future point in time.  
 The theory that people’s support for redistribution is a direct function of self-
interest, however, finds relatively weak support in a number of empirical studies (Gilens 
1999; Fong 2001; Fong et al. 2006). Indeed, if it were true that individuals base their 
views about redistribution solely on their economic interests, we would likely see a great 
deal of variability across time in people’s preferences toward welfare programs as the 
economic situation changes. Yet, in fact, people’s economic situations exhibit greater 
variability than do trends in favorability toward welfare state programs (Brooks & Manza 
2007). In more recent years, rationalists have qualified their arguments by demonstrating 
that both economic and non-economic factors are important predictors of redistributive 
attitudes (e.g. Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003).  
 A large body of work, however, suggests that identity—and not self-interest—
drives people’s redistributive attitudes. One popular argument holds that redistribution 
“presupposes the existence of a…cohesive community whose members…are linked by 
reciprocity ties vis-à-vis common risks and similar needs” (Ferrera 2005, p. 2). This 
argument, which links directly to theories of categorization (Turner 1975) and social 
identity theory (Billig & Tajfel 1973), is supported by evidence demonstrating that racial 
and ethnic cleavages within a country decrease support for redistribution (Gilens 1999; 
Luttmer 2001; Eger 2010; see also Alesina & Glaeser 2004), as well as by evidence that 
identification with the nation mitigates the negative effects of racial/ethnic heterogeneity 
(Transue 2007; Johnston et al. 2010).   
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  Scholars of social diversity, however, are not self-interest’s only detractors. 
European sociologists have pinpointed citizens’ perceptions that welfare recipients are 
“deserving” as being predictive of their support for redistribution (van Oorschot 2006; 
Slothuus 2007). Deservingness has also been found to be an important predictor among 
Americans’ attitudes toward welfare (Aarøe & Petersen 2013), as have Americans’ 
perceptions that the poor are willing to work (Gilens 1999; Miller 1999). Overlapping to 
some extent with theories of deservingness, Fong (2006) argues that feelings of empathy 
are important for support. Fong’s work builds on a large body of work in social 
psychology (introduced in the next chapter) that highlights the role of empathy in 
motivating individuals to help others.   
 In this brief review, which I expand upon in following chapters, I have attempted 
to cover the most compelling and accepted aspects of the literature. The review highlights 
not only the diversity of possible explanations for people’s support for redistribution, but 
it also reveals, I believe, an important—and often overlooked—puzzle. It is clear that 
self-interest, group identity, and compassionate concerns (e.g. empathy, deservingness, 
values) appear to play a role in fostering individuals’ attitudes about redistribution. What 
fewer works have sought to do, however, is explore how these multifarious factors 
interact. Indeed, existing evidence and theories lead to a somewhat paradoxical 
conclusion: Attitudes about welfare redistribution simultaneously are affected both by a 
Hobbesian sense of self-preservation and by feelings of empathy and obligation toward 
others. This study seeks to untangle this paradox.  
 
 
	  	   10	  
The Public’s Role 
 
 One assumption that underlies the vast literature on public support for economic 
redistribution is that this support is necessary—along both a practical and normative 
dimension—for the continued operation of governmental redistributive programs. This 
assumption is supported by a separate literature demonstrating the linkage between 
citizen support for redistribution and the existence of welfare programs in the West. 
Given the nature of the available data, these studies are unable to address causality 
directly. Nonetheless, although it is unlikely that public opinion always drives, let alone 
determines, politicians’ choices, it is likely that public opinion bounds the range of policy 
choices that politicians can make if they wish to seek reelection (see Page & Shapiro 
1983 and, for a more detailed perspective, Manza et al. 2002).  
 Especially in democracies, citizens’ opinions about redistribution are likely to 
play an important role in determining the degree of social welfare protection offered by 
the state.3 The institutionalization of redistribution, however, may serve to cement public 
support for welfare. In other words, not only might citizens’ support for redistribution 
help ensure the survival of welfare programs, but the existence of welfare programs 
might serve to bolster public support for redistribution. This study steers clear of this 
complex issue by focusing on the uncontroversial argument that public support, though 
perhaps neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the survival of welfare 
programs, does provide the bounds in which politicians can operate safely. In settings 
where public support for redistribution is high, a politician risks losing the next election if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This, of course, is an ideal, and recent work by Gilens (2012) suggests this ideal is far 
from being reached, at least in the American case. 
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he or she instigates reforms to shutter welfare programs. In contexts where mass support 
for redistribution is low, however, politicians do not risk their re-election bids when they 
support weakening the redistributive power of the state (Pierson 1995; Manza et al. 
2002).  
  
Only Americans Hate Welfare? 
  
 The United States is oftentimes considered the outlier in discussions regarding 
welfare provisions in the developed world. The problems associated with inequality, of 
course, are not confined to the United States. Although research often links Americans’ 
distaste for redistribution to the degree of social heterogeneity in the US (Alesina & 
Glaeser 2004), similar dynamics operate in other advanced welfare states as well—“even 
in Sweden” (Eger 2010). In fact, current debates throughout the industrialized world 
suggest that the contours of welfare redistribution are in flux and possibly under threat. 
Recent news reports suggest that citizens in both the United States (Luhby 2012) and 
Germany (Wiedermann &Turzer 2012) have reason to believe that welfare provisions fail 
to cover the basic needs of recipients. Minority communities are frequently perceived as 
burdening the social welfare system, not only in California (Light 2011), but also in 
Germany (Focus 2010) and Sweden (Daley 2011). Furthermore, politicians in the US 
frequently toy with the idea of drastically cutting aid to the poor (Luhby 2012); and, in 
Europe, citizens’ as well as politicians’ opinions about growing redistribution of national 
funds to assist citizens in poorer European states, in the forms of economic bailouts and a 
number of European Union programs, are anything but certain (e.g. Hall 2011; 
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Kirschbaum 2012; Schoen 2012; Spiegel 2012). In short, Americans may be renowned 
for opposing welfare programs, but redistribution is contentious—or at least has the 
potential to be so—even in places where these programs are strongly entrenched. 
 
What Follows, in Brief 
 
 The following chapters will present and test the argument that people’s 
perceptions of commonality with welfare recipients condition the extent to which other 
factors—namely, self-interest, empathy, and values—influence their attitudes about 
redistribution. The following chapter develops this argument in greater depth. Later 
chapters will use a variety of data sources to test hypotheses drawn from this theory. 
Specifically, the third chapter uses cross-national and experimental data to test the 
conditional effect of perceptions of similarity on self-interest’s influence on redistributive 
attitudes. Because empathy is difficult—indeed impossible—to measure on cross-
national surveys, chapter four presents results from a series of experiments to 
demonstrate, first, how a change in perceptions of commonality affect the extent to which 
empathetic concerns influence redistributive attitudes and, second, how manipulating 
empathetic concerns results in divergent attitudes conditional on pre-existing perceptions 
of commonality. Chapter five takes a step back from the discussion on attitudes toward 
redistribution to examine the extent to which perceptions of commonality with the poor 
condition self-interest’s role in predicting partisanship. It is generally true that wealth 
correlates with support for parties on the right, but as I show in the fifth chapter, higher 
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income individuals support parties of the left when they perceive they share 
commonalities with the poor.   
 In addition to cleaning up a rather unwieldy literature by tying together its most 
important strands, this study has the potential to speak practically to policymakers, 
pundits, and other influential citizens who are interested in ways to bolster (or, on the 
contrary, weaken) mass support for redistributive programs. As I have noted, it is 
commonly assumed that individuals’ attitudes about redistribution are a function of their 
self-interest. Politicians, particularly those who are opposed to redistribution, often speak 
of these programs’ costs. Yet, if this study’s findings are correct, self-interest is likely to 
appeal only to a subset of the population: Those who feel disconnected from, or perceive 
that they have little in common with, the targeted recipients. Those who wish to boost 
support, attempts to spark empathy or attempts to make values conducive to helping the 
less well-off salient will increase support for redistribution, but only among those who 
perceive that they share similarities with the poor.  
 Among people who feel they share very little in common with the poor, self-
interest dominates and empathetic and value appeals by politicians and pro-redistribution 
influential activists will fall on deaf ears. For people who do not perceive similarities 
with others, life takes on a Hobbesian tint, whereby goals are concomitant with 
individuals’ narrow self-interest and little concern is paid to the nasty, brutish, and short 
lives of others. Luckily, as I demonstrate below, the world is not entirely run by self-
interest. Empathy, spurred by perceptions that individuals are linked by commonalities, 
can increase support the welfare of others. As perceptions of commonality increase, the 
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power of empathy also rises to positively influence redistributive attitudes and the power 
of self-interest recedes.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Fitting the Pieces Together 
  
 In the first chapter, I outlined the literature that has sprung up to explain public 
attitudes about economic redistribution in democracies from the rich to the poor and 
identified the paradoxical finding that both self-interested and altruistic concerns exert 
influence over these attitudes. It is unlikely that these two opposing sources of motivation 
are capable of exerting influence over the same person’s attitudes simultaneously and to 
the same degree, so the question arises of when, or among whom, is self-interest a 
stronger predictor of redistributive attitudes and when, or among whom, are altruistic 
concerns—such as empathy or values—predominant?  
 I contend that the answers to these questions hinge on the degree to which 
individuals identify with the recipients of redistribution. As I will describe in more depth 
below, identification with recipients—or, more accurately, perceptions of similarity or 
commonality4 with recipients—provides for the psychological conditions that enable 
helping behaviors and that bring altruistic concerns to the fore. These conditions 
minimize the relevance of self-interest, as the distinctions between self and other become 
less salient. On the other hand, the absence of perceptions of similarity makes for an 
environment less amenable to the materialization of altruistic concerns. Here, the 
distinctions between self and other are highly salient, and, when asked about their 
willingness to contribute assistance to others, individuals are more likely to think in terms 
of their own self-interest.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I use the terms commonality and similarity interchangeably throughout.  
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The Centrality of Commonality 
 
 Perceptions of commonality are central to understanding people’s support for 
welfare redistribution. These perceptions go hand-in-hand with the development of 
communal obligations, and have a direct effect on people’s willingness to lend assistance 
to those in need (Wong 2010). It is a sense of community, or solidarity, with others that 
lead directly to helping obligations, but in addition to having a direct influence on 
citizens’ attitudes and behaviors, a sense of community offers a sense of security in 
which altruistic endeavors can flourish and provides the space for the expression of 
shared values.   
 That the welfare of similar others is of more direct relevance to individuals 
relative to the welfare of dissimilar others is relatively unsurprising in light of the 
literature on identity and redistribution. Economic and political science literatures have 
been relatively slow, however, in identifying the mechanisms that induce people to 
provide support to similarly-perceived others. The tendency for people to behave 
prosocially toward similar others fills in this gap. People are more likely to support 
redistribution that benefits similar others not just out of a sense of group solidarity, but 
because feelings of altruism and empathy are more likely to spur people to assist others 
with whom they share commonality. It is difficult to feel empathetic toward a person 
whose situation and background one does not comprehend. Perceptions of similarity, by 
definition, provide, or at least signify, this comprehension. Perceptions of similarity 
provide people with an a priori intuition that they understand the plight of others. When 
this plight is brought to the fore, they are then more likely to be spurred by their 
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empathetic leanings to behave in altruistic manner than individuals who do not have this 
a priori sense of understanding.  
 The relationship between perceptions of similarity and empathy is largely 
supported in the psychological literature on helping and empathy, which reveals how 
shared group identity induces individuals to behave prosocially. Existing research 
demonstrates that empathy motivates people to behave altruistically toward (Krebs 1975; 
Stürmer et al. 2006) and, more specifically, to help (Hornstein 1978; Batson et al., 1981) 
others, especially when those others are perceived as similar.  
 More generally, perceptions of similarity provide a safe space in which altruistic 
endeavors are more likely to occur. Within groups of similar others, people are likely to 
believe that the chances of reciprocation of altruistic help are high, compared to situations 
involving more heterogeneous groups of people (Fong et al, 2006). It is important to note, 
however, that with the minimization of interpersonal differences comes a greater sense of 
shared humanity, which potentially encourages altruistic behaviors even in the absence of 
reciprocation. Indeed, when it comes to contemporary welfare redistribution, it is 
unreasonable to believe that the rich, or even the upper middle classes, ever expect lower 
class recipients of government assistance to return the favor. Yet, as I will show, this does 
not hinder some members of the upper classes to favor redistribution for altruistic 
reasons.  
 These arguments fit well with a newer dimension in the larger psychological 
literature on helping in general, where findings demonstrate that different sources of 
motivation spur individuals to help more-similar and more-different others (Dovidio et 
al., 1997; Levine et al., 2005; Omoto & Snyder 2002). I argue, however, that the 
	  	   18	  
importance of perceptions of similarity can tell us about much more than people’s 
attitudes toward redistribution. Just as these perceptions should condition the influence of 
self-interest on redistributive attitudes, perceptions of commonality should also condition 
the relationship between self-interest and partisanship. While it is true that income often 
correlates with support for parties of the right, I expect that perceptions of commonality 
with the poor mitigate wealthier people’s support for parties traditionally opposed to 
redistribution. In other words, not only do perceptions of similarity with the poor 
influence people’s attitudes about redistribution—both directly and indirectly by 
conditioning factors such as self-interest and empathy—but these perceptions have clear 
political implications insofar as they influence citizens’ partisanship in ways not 
predicted by theories of self-interest. 
 This discussion highlights at least two relevant questions. First, who perceives 
similarities with whom? Extant research typically uses broad categories of identification, 
such as nation, ethnicity, or race to gauge individuals’ social identities, but these 
measures do not allow for the permeability of group boundaries, which is troublesome 
when one wishes to study the ability of individuals to feel similar to (or identify with) 
members of different demographic categories. Second, are these perceptions static or are 
they influenced by contextual or environmental factors? Again, existing theories and 
research methods have done more to reify group boundaries, while ignoring the extent to 
which group identifications are contextually dependent and fluid. 
 The answer to the question of who perceives similarities with whom is a 
complicated one, to say the least. Perceptions of similarity undoubtedly are used to 
navigate everyday life, as people categorize themselves and others as belonging to groups 
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in order to simplify the otherwise complex social world in which they find themselves 
(Turner 1975). This categorization—and resulting identification with one’s group—in 
turn results in ingroup favoritism at the expense of the outgroup, which has a direct 
influence on behavior (Billig & Tajfel 1973). People typically categorize both themselves 
and others as belonging to multiple groups, and which categories are most salient 
depends on the specific context (Brewer 1991). It is important to highlight this caveat 
because its implications have been minimized in political science research.  
 For instance, one would expect that poor citizens might strongly favor welfare, 
but if identification with the nation is most salient, the poor may be less likely to support 
redistribution compared to contexts when class-based identities are most salient (Shayo 
2009). That individuals have multiple identities also helps explain why not all white 
Americans oppose redistribution to African Americans (e.g. Gilens 1999) or why not all 
Swedes appear to oppose redistribution to immigrants (Eger 2010). It is certainly the case 
that the white/black and native/immigrant categorizations are important for some people. 
Yet, because, for example, native Swedes can categorize themselves as belonging to a 
number of different groups, sometimes they may categorize themselves and immigrants 
as belonging to the same group. Because these individuals categorize themselves and 
immigrants as sharing membership in a third (and possibly fourth, fifth, etc.) group, the 
native/immigrant divide may lessen in importance in determining their support for 
redistribution. This line of reasoning draws much from Gaertner & Dovidio’s (2000) 
Common Ingroup Identity Model, which draws attention to the possibility of expanding 
people’s perceptions of their ingroup’s boundaries in order to include former outgroup 
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members. What is noteworthy is that group boundaries are hardly as static as they are 
made to appear in survey-based social scientific research. 
 Nevertheless, most research on redistribution has focused on discrete identity 
traits that correlate with an individual’s stand on redistribution. What is lacking is a 
bigger-picture assessment of how particular combinations and configurations of these 
multiple traits factor into the equation. This is why I believe it is necessary to draw 
attention to people’s perceptions of similarity as opposed to their direct group identity. In 
other words, it is a question of complex and multi-layered, or multi-dimensional, identity, 
as opposed to single identity traits, that is key. This mode of conceptualizing identity fits 
well with Wimmer’s (2000) theory of cultural compromise, which stresses the 
importance of the researcher’s neutrality in regards to the specific group identifications 
(e.g. class, gender, ethnicity, race, etc.) that individuals use to structure their social 
interactions. Thus, the pertinent question becomes to what extent do you feel you are 
similar to x, as opposed to to what extent do you identify as [nationality] or to what 
extent do you and x identify with the same group.  
 Given the socially-dependent nature of people’s perceptions of commonality with 
others and the various dimensions on which people may form linkages, people’s feelings 
of similarity toward others are fluid and can change overtime and in different contexts 
(Brewer 1991). This implies that people can support redistribution to one group of 
people, but not to another, and that one person’s attitudes about redistribution may 
change overtime as that individual’s perceptions of similarity with welfare recipients 
change.  
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Receding Commonality  
 
 Although identification with others enables empathy and, by extension, extends 
support for redistribution, the fact of the matter is that a great number of groups of 
individuals perceive that they are dissimilar from one another. It is well established that 
the ingroup/outgroup dynamics arising from perceptions of dissimilarities between the 
rich and the poor are associated with a sharp decline in support for economic 
redistribution. This finding is most commonly witnessed in the United States, where 
better-off citizens (whites) are hesitant to support welfare programs they see as catering 
to the poor (blacks), whom are typically stereotyped as lazy and undeserving (Gilens 
1999). The same story, however, plays out in Europe as well, where rising rates of 
migration of citizens from poorer, darker-skinned countries are often portrayed as taking 
unfair advantages of welfare state benefits. Even Sweden, whose welfare state has helped 
bring citizens perhaps the greatest amount of economic equality in the industrialized 
world, increases in immigration and the migration of refugees are linked to decreased 
support for redistribution (Eger 2009).  
 In the absence of perceptions of commonality, the chance that empathy with the 
poor might spark a sense of obligation to help others tumbles. As perceptions of 
similarity with others recede, so too do perceived understandings of the other’s situation 
and plight. This, naturally, does not imply that people who perceive that they share little 
or nothing in common with the poor automatically oppose welfare—although it does 
imply that these people will be less likely to support redistribution than others. Why, 
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though, might individuals who do not identify with the poor, and who have little empathy 
for the poor, support welfare?  
 One factor that I believe is key in understanding support for redistribution among 
this subset of the population is self-interest. The distinction between the self and others 
becomes fuzzy when one strongly identifies with these others. Thus, the power of self-
interest to influence one’s opinions about providing assistance to these others becomes 
equally opaque. As perceptions of similarity—a key component of ingroup 
identification—fade, the boundary between self and others becomes starker by definition. 
Whereas self-interest may be indistinguishable from group interest or muted entirely by 
solidarity with others among those who perceive they share similarities with the poor, a 
different picture emerges when we examine those who feel they are different from the 
poor. Among this group of individuals, self-interest is no longer muted or 
indistinguishable from other factors. Hence, support for welfare becomes more heavily 
dependent on the extent to which redistribution is in the perceived interests of the 
individual. In other words, individuals who do not identify with welfare recipients 
nonetheless believe that they personally will benefit from redistribution are likely to 
support redistributive programs. On the other hand, individuals who do not identify with 
recipients and who do not believe that redistribution serves their interests are much less 
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Defining Self-Interest 
 
 Before proceeding, it is necessary to define self-interest, which, without proper 
specification, risks becoming tautological. Following the lead of Sears and Funk (1991), I 
define self-interest narrowly by focusing on individuals’ calculations of their own short-
term material costs and benefits. This definition includes five important components: 
calculations, own, short-term, material, and costs and benefits. I will discuss each of these 
components in detail, justifying why they are theoretically and empirically necessary in 
defining self-interest for the project at hand.  
 The first and last components of the definition of self-interest, calculations and 
costs and benefits, work in tandem and are highly cognitive in nature. These components 
require individuals to assess, either consciously or subconsciously, all information 
relevant to both their current and prospective wellbeing. While these components are 
relatively uncontroversial (and, at first glance, trite), their importance becomes clearer 
when one considers how socioeconomic factors and informational flows influence the 
extent to which citizens make, and are capable of making, these calculations. For 
instance, people with higher education levels arguably are more capable of calculating 
the material costs and benefits of government policies relative to the uneducated. 
Relatedly, the quality of information at one’s disposal also influences people’s ability to 
calculate costs and benefits. 
 The second component of the definition, own, likely is no more controversial, but 
it is perhaps somewhat more difficult to pin down. Although there is a distinction 
between self and group-interest, where this distinction lies is less than clear. Here, “own” 
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refers to one’s calculation of personal short-term material cost and benefits—not the cost 
and benefits associated with the material wellbeing of a larger group. It is important, 
however, to concede that it is occasionally impossible to discriminate one’s own, 
personal wellbeing from that of others’. This is especially the case when one takes into 
account family structures where one’s material wellbeing is inseparable from that of 
fellow family members. Theoretically, this familial caveat applies where individuals are 
cognitively unable to calculate their own costs and benefits without taking into 
consideration other family members’ costs and benefits. For example, this could result 
from situations where one family member relies on the income of another family 
member, or in situations where income from every family member is combined to cover 
everyone’s living expenses.  
 Following the lead of other scholars of self-interest, I define the concept with a 
view toward individuals’ short-term costs and benefits (Sears & Funk 1991). By focusing 
narrowly on the short-term, I am able to avoid the empirical pitfalls inherent in mapping 
out individuals’ long-term interests. Although individuals indubitably have long-term 
interests, it is also undoubtedly the case that people are more capable of identifying what 
is better for them in the short-term as opposed to what is best in the long-term. Over the 
long-term, past costs may turn out to have later benefits, and vice-versa. For example, no 
one wants to lose their job because doing so is not in their short-term best interest; 
however, though a lost job means less money in the short-term, it may result in finding a 
higher paying job down the road. Is this to say that losing the job was in a person’s self-
interest? In the short-term the answer is a definite no; in the long-term, extraneous events, 
and luck or fate, muddle the picture. People typically are myopic when it comes to their 
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economic well being. This may be so because it is easier for people to foresee what their 
personal (household) finances will look like next month than it is to tell what their 
economic situation will be in seven years. It definitely is no easier for academics to 
identify and measure people’s long-term interests. As suggested by the example above, in 
the long-term, nearly any life contingency might be construed in hindsight as being in 
one’s self-interest. A lost job might result in a better-paying job; having a near-death 
experience might lead to a life-altering epiphany; higher taxes early in life might lead to 
better care later in life. Few people want to lose their job, have a near-death experience, 
or pay higher taxes, of course, because of the short-term consequences, which are easier 
to quantify and predict.  
 Lastly, the definition of self-interest used in this study concentrates attention on 
individuals’ material resources. Critics might argue that this is too narrow a definition. 
They might cite that people who contribute to charities do so in their self-interest, not 
because doing so will bring them any profit but because it makes them feel good about 
themselves. Using the critic’s definition of self-interest, any action that positively affects 
an individual’s mood, emotions, or more generally psychological state, is in that 
individual’s self-interest to pursue—even when these acts contradict the individual’s 
material interests. Not only is the critic’s definition tautological (which is enough of a 
reason to discount it), but it also contradicts how the vast majority of people both in and 
out of academia define and use the concept. It is in an individual’s self-interest to donate 
to charity if one is chasing tax deductions; but self-interest’s role disappears when one 
donates to charity out of a sense of altruism or empathy.  
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 Acting on altruism, empathy, and related motivations might make people feel 
good about themselves. Interestingly, however, among some individuals this feeling 
likely stems from a recognition, or sense of pride, that they acted despite of their own 
self-interest. It is, of course, illogical that one furthers one’s self-interest by purposefully 
negating one’s self-interest. Therefore, in line with other mainstream researchers, the 







 It should be clear that both self-interest and altruism affect people’s attitudes 
toward helping others. It is perfectly reasonable that some people, in certain contexts, 
find their behaviors and beliefs governed by self-interest, whereas the behaviors and 
beliefs of other people, in other contexts, are influenced more strongly by altruism or 
empathy. It is also quite expectable that people might find their opinions dictated by self-
interest at one time and by empathetic emotions at another. Yet, the literature to date on 
public attitudes toward redistribution has frequently pitted one explanation against the 
other in a dichotomous fashion that left little room for the possibility that both matter. 
This blindness, I suspect, in part results from the disposition of scholars to base their 
theories on grand theories of human nature. In other words, theorists’ focus on self-
interest versus altruism likely boils down to their assumptions of human beings as being 
naturally selfish or giving in nature.  
 But, of course, humans are capable of being both selfish and giving, and this 
chapter laid the groundwork for understanding how both self-interest and altruism-
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empathy together explain public attitudes toward redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
Tying in studies of group identity, I argue that perceptions of commonality vis-à-vis 
welfare recipients condition the influence these separate considerations have on 
redistributive attitudes. Namely, redistributive attitudes are more likely to be driven by 
self-interest when the people in question do not perceive they share commonalities with 
the poor. For these people, no sense of community, obligation, or linked fate binds them 
to those in need, thus leaving ample room for self-interest to play a defining role. People, 
however, who perceive that they share commonality with welfare recipients are more 
likely to find themselves swayed by altruism-empathy and less by self-interest. This is 
because perceptions of commonality underscore a shared group identity, replete with 
feelings—either conscious or, perhaps more likely, not—of community, obligation, and 
shared fate. Not only does the distinction between the self and the other become blurred, 
but group values and norms, as well as the psychological benefit of feeling part of a 
group, dilute the salience of monetary or material concerns—concerns that are vital in 
academic and lay conceptions of self-interest. It is the topic of self-interest to which I turn 








 Although a review of the evidence makes it quite clear that self-interest is far 
from the solitary factor determining people’s attitudes toward welfare redistribution, it is 
nonetheless equally as obvious that self-interest does figure into some people’s opinions 
about welfare at least some of the time. Indeed, the underlying logic inherent in the 
Meltzer & Richard model, that the rich oppose the redistribution of their wealth to the 
poor and that the poor support this redistribution, appears so commonsensical that it must 
accurately reflect some degree of reality.  
 It is to delineating when, or among whom, self-interest plays an important role in 
predicting, or even affecting, people’s attitudes about economic redistribution that I turn 
my attention in this chapter. As sketched out in the previous chapter, I expect that the 
importance self-interest has in influencing helping behavior becomes less salient in step 
with heightened perceptions of commonality vis-à-vis others. Group norms, 
psychological benefits, or perhaps group interests diminish the power of raw self-interest 
in situations where individuals identify themselves as being similar to those in need.  
 The opposite is the case, naturally, among those individuals who identify 
themselves as being dissimilar to those in need. The less that group obligations bind 
people together, the more decisive self-interest becomes. In these contexts, individuals 
are prone to think of and for themselves—they are individualized. Many times, people in 
this situation might dismiss extending support to those in need out of hand. In the context 
of this study, this implies that these individuals’ likelihood of opposing welfare 
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redistribution is higher than those who perceive similarities link them to recipients. Social 
(ethnic, racial, class, etcetera) differences between the haves and the have-nots potentially 
elicit reflexive opposition to welfare—a hypothesis broadly supported by the empirical 
literature (e.g. Gilens 1999; Wong 2010).  
 Yet, this opposition is not guaranteed and, in fact, can be mitigated by self-
interest. Not all “haves” are, after all, equal. Some are more at risk of requiring welfare 
assistance than others. In simplified form, the rich who perceive that they have very little 
in common with welfare recipients support redistribution with a low probability. They 
lack the sense of solidarity to do so, and they find that redistribution is at odds with their 
self-interest. As one goes down the economic ladder, however, the picture changes. 
Although, for instance, a person in the lower-middle class might still perceive that he 
shares very little in common with his vision of the prototypical welfare recipient, he is 
more likely than the tycoon to find redistribution in his self-interest. He might already 
benefit from redistribution or believe that he might in the future. 
 This chapter seeks to investigate these claims empirically, using both pre-existing 
and new data resources. A number of existing national and cross-national survey projects 
include questions regarding respondents’ attitudes about redistribution in their protocols. 
Unfortunately, fewer existing surveys probe respondents about their perceptions of 
commonalities vis-à-vis welfare recipients. Nonetheless, the data I turn to below are 
global in scope: From the United States and Western Europe to greater Eurasia. I use 
these survey data to assess the extent to which the predictive power of self-interest on 
redistributive attitudes is conditional upon perceptions of similarity. I augment the large-n 
analysis with a series of original experiments I conducted in the United States. As I 
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explain in more depth below, these experiments allow me to test more explicitly the 
relationships between self-interest, perceptions of commonality, and redistributive 
attitudes.  
 
The United States 
 
 I begin the analysis with data from the United States, where welfare redistribution 
is commonly conceived as a highly contentious political issue even though, relative to 
redistributive programs in other industrialized democracies, very little income or wealth 
is redistributed from the rich to the poor (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Some scholars, such 
as Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Gilens (1999), argue that welfare spending and 
welfare support are low in the United States due to the country’s relatively high degree of 
social heterogeneity, which works to undermine the social solidarity many see as 
necessary for economic redistribution. At the same time, however, the assumptions of the 
Meltzer-Richard (1981) model that holds that redistributive preferences are a direct 
outcome of one’s placement on the economic ladder, such as majority rule electoral rules, 
are predicated on the American and British experience.  
 In this section, I analyze 1996 American National Election Study (ANES) survey 
results to see if American’s perceptions of similarity with the poor condition the extent to 
which their self-interest influences their attitudes about redistribution. Preferably, I could 
use newer ANES data to augment the 1996 data, but unfortunately, the relevant questions 
regarding respondents’ perceptions of similarity with the poor were not included in 
subsequent years.  
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Dependent Variable  
 
 The dependent variable used in analysis of the US data is drawn from a single, 
straightforward question that asks about people’s thoughts about redistribution from the 
rich to the poor: 
Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the 
income differences between the rich and the poor. Suppose these people 
are at one end of a scale at point 1. Other people think that the government 
should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the 
rich and the poor. Suppose these people are at the other end of a scale at 
point 7. And of course some other people have opinions at points 2, 3, 4, 
5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you 
thought much about this? 
 
 
Independent Variables and their Differing Influences 
 
 Self-interest is captured using income. In order to differentiate respondents who 
perceive similarities with welfare recipients from those who do not, I use responses based 
on responses to the following: “Please read over the list and tell me the letter for those 
groups you feel particularly close to—people who are most like you in their ideas and 
interests and feelings about things.” Respondents were shown the following list of 
groups, which were assigned a letter: Poor people, Asian Americans, Liberals, The 
elderly, Blacks, Labor unions, Feminists, Southerners, Business people, Young people, 
Conservatives, Hispanic-Americans, Women, Working-class people, Whites, Middle-
class people, and Men.  
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 To capture respondents’ perceptions of similarity with welfare beneficiaries, I 
created a zero to three index. Respondents who did not list the poor, blacks, or Hispanics 
were assigned a zero, those who chose all three were assigned a three, and those who 
chose one or two of the groups were coded accordingly. This measure accounts for the 





 Table 3.1 shows the estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression from 
the analysis of the American data. As shown, the hypothesis is unsupported in these data, 
and in fact, the coefficient for the Income*Dissimilarity interaction leans in the wrong 
direction. These findings, while disappointing, do not fully undermine this chapter’s 
hypotheses.  
 Namely, it is important to note that the variable measuring perceptions of 
similarity does not account well for the possibility that, though people coded 0 do not feel 
that they share similarities with probable recipients of redistribution, these individuals 
might not feel that they are dissimilar from recipients either. In other words, not choosing 
African Americans, Poor people, or Hispanics from the list of groups to whom you feel 
close to does not imply that you feel far from members of these groups. As such, the 
measure provides a decent measure of who feels close to probable recipients, but not of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It should be noted, however, that using the measure of any group individually or using a 
combination of any two of the groups does not alter the results in any meaningful way. 
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who perceives they are dissimilar. As I show below, a better measure of perceptions of 
similarity produces results more in line with this study’s hypotheses. 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
 The situation in the United Kingdom regarding the redistribution of income from 
the rich to the poor is similar to that found in the United States insofar as the 1980’s 
witnessed a degree of welfare retrenchment under Thatcher and Reagan not experienced 
in other industrialized democracies (Pierson 1994). Furthermore, the United Kingdom 
and the United States are among the most unequal of the top industrialized democracies 
in terms of income distribution (Wilkerson & Pickett, 2010), and both are generally 
categorized as welfare states in the economically liberal tradition (Esping-Anderson, 
1990).  
 The following analysis, therefore, offers a test of the self-interest hypothesis in a 
similar social context, and importantly using different measures. Indeed, the British 
Social Attitudes Survey (2009) offers a more finely tuned measure of people’s 
perceptions of the poor than that found in other social surveys, as discussed below. Given 
the null results of the American study, testing the hypothesis in a relatively similar 
context, using stronger measures, is of vital importance. If the data were to uncover no 
conditional influence of perceptions of similarity on self-interest’s relationship with 
redistributive attitudes, the validity of the theory presented in this study rightly would be 
called into question. In fact, the results presented below lend support to this hypothesis. 
Unsurprisingly, it appears that a stronger, more adequate measure of perceptions of 
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commonality is better able to demonstrate the power of these perceptions to alter the 




 To measure support for redistribution among respondents to the 2009 British 
Social Attitudes Survey, I use responses to the following question: 
 “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” [1 strongly 
disagree to 5 strongly agree]  
 
Independent Variables and their Differing Influences 
 
 In order to measure self-interest, I again follow the literature by focusing on 
respondents’ household income. The relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables, however, are expected to diverge across different subgroups in the sample. In 
order to measure perceptions of similarity, I turn to responses to the following question: 
“In general, how close do you feel to immigrants from non-western countries? By close 
we mean how much do you feel you have in common with them. Please answer on a 
scale from 1 to 9 where a score of 1 means not at all close and a score of 9 means very 
close.” Unfortunately, similar questions were not asked pertaining to perceptions toward 
the unemployed or the poor more generally. However, because the British elite and 
public often associate welfare recipients with immigrants (Daley, 2011; Light, 2011; 
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Osborn, 2013), it is logical to assume that people’s perceptions of immigrants are tightly 




 The OLS estimates in Table 3.2 show provide support for the hypothesis: Namely, 
as perceptions of dissimilarity increase, self-interest’s negative influence on support for 
redistribution also increases.  
 Data from the 2009 survey also allow me to delve somewhat deeper to test the 
self-interest hypothesis. For this part of the analysis, I use the following question to 
measure the dependent variable: “Do you think Britain spends too much money, too little 
money, or about the right amount on improving the living conditions of immigrants from 
non-western countries?” [1 too much to 3 too little]. Redistribution favoring immigrants 
is likely to evince at least two dimensions of self-interest. In line with the previously used 
measure, self-interested individuals are likely to think in terms of their personal income. 
However, some richer individuals may favor government redistribution to immigrants 
because they perceive immigration as beneficial to their personal business interests. 
Although benefits for immigrants may come out of their pockets, this cost may be more 
than offset by the benefits of cheap immigrant labor for their firms.  
 Among other workers, however, this should not be the case. Among workers who 
glean no self-interested benefits from the government providing benefits to immigrants, 
we should find that the more one earns and the more one perceives oneself to be 
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dissimilar to immigrants, the less one should support redistribution to immigrants (i.e. 
hypothesis two).   
 In order to distinguish between those whose self-interest might lead them to 
support redistribution toward immigrants despite its possible effects on personal income 
and those for whom this should not be the case, I divide respondents by occupational 
class. In the first group, I include those who have higher positions in organizations that 
are likely to benefit from immigration. These are workers who are (or were) employers in 
large organizations; are (were) in higher management and professional positions as well 
as lower management and professional positions; those in higher technical and 
supervisory occupations; and those classified as having intermediate occupations. In the 
second group, I include individuals who are more likely to perceive immigrants as 
competing for their jobs. These are employers in small organizations, own account 
workers; those employed in lower supervisory and technical occupations; and those 
employed in semi-routine and routine occupations. All other measures are the same as 
above. 
 As a first step, I test if type of occupation is associated with support for 
redistribution favoring immigrants. This simple test allows me to confirm that attitudes 
about redistribution to immigrants are associated with one’s placement in one of the two 
occupational classes. The first column in Table 3.3 presents the OLS results from a non-
interactive model and shows that occupational type (Group 1 coded 1, Group 2 coded 0) 
is positively and statistically significantly related to support for redistribution toward 
immigrants, as is income. That is, people who stand to gain from immigration favor 
redistribution to immigrants more than those who do not. 
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 The second and third columns support the claim made above that the people who 
both perceive that they share dissimilarities with immigrants and have greater income are 
less supportive of redistribution than are people who share similarities or have smaller 
incomes—but only when their earnings do not stand to benefit from immigration. Among 
individuals whose earnings do stand to benefit from immigration, the relationship 
between income and perceptions of dissimilarity disappears.  
 It is important to point out that, on average, individuals in Group 1 have higher 
incomes than those in Group 2 (11.70 and 7.94, respectively on a 1 to 17 point scale; t = 
20.95, df = 2653.68; p < 0.001). However, income in both groups is similarly distributed 
around the mean (standard deviations: 4.63 and 4.61, respectively). In other words, 
although incomes in Group 1 are higher than in Group 2 on average, we find a great deal 
of variation in income in both groups. Thus, the results are not driven by a lack of 
variation in income in either group. 
 
Cross-National Analysis  
 
 To this point, I have examined the extent to which perceptions of commonality 
condition the influence of self-interest on respondents’ attitudes about redistribution 
within two fairly similar contexts—the United States and the United Kingdom. Although 
the opinions of citizens of these two countries are undoubtedly important, it could be the 
case that perceptions of similarity exert a different influence on self-interest’s 
relationship on redistributive attitudes than is found in other contexts.  
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 In this section, I test the hypothesis on a much larger and more diverse sample. 
Using the 2008 wave of the European Values Survey, which surveys respondents in 
forty-six countries on their opinions on a variety of political and social issues, I am able 
to probe if the self-interest hypothesis is generalizable beyond the liberal welfare states of 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Although the survey includes respondents 
from welfare state stalwarts in Scandinavia and Western Europe, the survey was also 
fielded in countries research on redistribution often overlooks, such as Russia, Serbia, 
Turkey, and Armenia among many others.6 Although it is certainly the case that 
entrenched welfare programs are most evident in wealthier industrialized democracies, as 
epitomized by the Scandinavian welfare states, redistribution—whether in practice or in 
aspiration—is a common feature common to more political systems than is apparent in 




 Turning to the final survey analysis, in order to capture people’s attitudes toward 
redistribution, I use responses to the following prompt: “On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?: 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The full list of countries/regions include: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Cyprus Turkish 
Cypriot Community, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, 
Montenegro, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine. 
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incomes should be made more equal [through] 10 there should be greater incentives for 
individual effort.”7  
 
Independent Variables and their Different Influences 
 
 In order to measure self-interest, I again use a measure of household income. In 
order to assess whether individuals perceive the poor to be more similar or more 
different, I use a question on the EVS that asks about respondents’ perceptions regarding 
the causes of poverty: “Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are 
four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important? [because 
they are unlucky; because of laziness and lack of willpower; because of injustice in our 
society; it’s an inevitable part of modern progress; none of these].” 
 While the adequacy of this question may not be immediately apparent, I argue 
that people’s perceptions of the causes of poverty relate very much to how they perceive 
the poor vis-à-vis themselves. For instance, people who believe that those in need are 
poor out of laziness or lack of willpower hold negative stereotypes of the poor. Because 
people are less likely to use negative stereotypes to define the groups to which they 
themselves belong (Fishkin et al. 1993; Ryan & Bogart 1997), I argue that people who 
stereotype the poor as lazy perceive very few similarities between themselves and the 
poor.8 When people do not negatively stereotype the poor, it is less likely the case that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Responses were coded in the reverse, so that 1 denotes opposition to and 10 support for 
redistribution. 
8 By using this measure, I assume that people are unlikely to describe themselves as lazy. 
I would argue that poor individuals who believe that people live in need because of their 
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they consider that they and the poor belong to two separate groups, and are therefore 
more likely to perceive that they share similarities.9  
 This assumption is supported using data the 1996 American sample. In addition to 
the variables analyzed above, the 1996 survey asked respondents if they believed African 
Americans were hardworking (coded 1) or lazy (coded 7). Using the measure of 
perceived similarities specifically with blacks discussed above, I find that these 
perceptions are strongly associated with believing that African Americans are 
hardworking as opposed to lazy, even when controlling for a host of demographic 
variables such as income and minority status. The same is true of the relationship 
between believing that whites are hardworking and perceiving similarities with whites. 
This additional analysis lends credence to my supposition that perceptions of laziness are 
closely tied to perceptions of similarities. 
 Naturally, the lack of a negative stereotype does not immediately translate into 
perceptions of shared similarities, and, as such, I am more capable of identifying with this 
measure the subgroup that perceives the poor as being dissimilar than I am of identifying 
those who perceive that they share many similarities with the beneficiaries of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
laziness consider themselves the exception to the rule, and as such consider themselves as 
distinct (dissimilar) from other poor people.  
9 Of course, given the finding that members of certain minority groups may subscribe to 
negative group stereotypes (Simon & Hamilton 1994; Rudman et al. 2002), this measure 
is unable to sparse out poor people who identify with the poor while still considering the 
poor lazy. This, I believe, is a very minor problem. First, these individuals, if they exist at 
all, would represent a miniscule proportion of the sample. Second, studies of minority 
individuals’ negative self-stereotypes focus primarily on the influence these stereotypes 
have on individuals’ personal performance or behavior and have yet to thoroughly 
examine if these negative stereotypes bolster or undermine group solidarity. I would 
wager that individuals who associate negative stereotypes with other ingroup members 
feel less similar to these other members than do individuals who associate positive 
stereotypes with the group. This, of course, is an empirical question, but is beyond the 
purview of the current study. 
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redistribution. Nonetheless, I do believe that this measure is capable of identifying those 
individuals who are more likely to perceive similarities linking them to the poor. I count 
respondents who believe that people live in need because they are unlucky, because of 
injustice in society, and because it’s an inevitable part of modern progress as those who 
are more likely than others to perceive that they share similarities with the poor. These 
individuals do not associate negative stereotypes with being poor; instead, they are more 







 Table 3.4 shows the OLS estimates from the cross-national analysis. Here, I again 
find support for the self-interest hypothesis. Among people who perceive that they are 
dissimilar from recipients, higher incomes are strongly and negatively related to support 




 To this point, I have examined if variance in individuals’ perceptions of similarity 
with welfare recipients is associated with a change in the correlation between self-interest 
and redistributive attitudes. Naturally, by using cross-sectional survey data, the analysis 
thus far has been unable to ascertain the extent to which any of these relationships—i.e. 
the conditional relationship between perceptions of similarity on the one hand and self-
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interest and redistributive attitudes on the other, and the relationship between self-interest 
and redistributive attitudes—may be causal.  
 In order to gauge the extent to which changes in perceptions of commonality 
affect the extent to which self-interest influences attitudes about redistribution—and, 
separately, to capture the extent to which changes in self-interest matters only when 
perceptions of commonality are low—I conducted two experiments using undergraduate 
subjects at the University of Illinois. As the sample of students is hardly representative of 
any national population, the goal of the experiments is not to measure attitudes 
representative of any larger population. Instead, the experiments in this chapter aim to 
capture, first, the extent to which changes in perceptions affect changes in the 
relationship between self-interest and redistributive attitudes and, second, how changes in 
self-interest result in change in attitudes contingent on pre-existing perceptions of 
similarity.  
 In the first experiment, I directly manipulate subjects’ perceptions of 
commonality with welfare recipients. I then gauge the extent to which this manipulation 
results in a change in the relationship between subjects’ self-interest and their attitudes 
toward redistribution to the poor. Building on the first experiment, the second experiment 
first gauges subjects’ pre-existing perceptions of similarity with recipients. I then 
manipulate subjects’ self-interest. As I explain below, based on the theory exposited 
above, changes in self-interest should affect a commensurate change in redistributive 
attitudes among subjects who perceive few commonalities vis-à-vis recipients but should 
not be associated with any change in welfare attitudes among subjects who perceive 
many commonalities.  
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 As is the case throughout this larger study, the use of undergraduate students as 
subjects in the experiments may serve as a hard test for the hypotheses under scrutiny. 
Undergraduate students are, by and large, more liberal, less (overtly) prejudiced, more 
educated, and most definitely younger than the larger population, making them perhaps 
one of the groups most likely to favor redistribution according to the literature. Therefore, 
self-interest manipulations, in this chapter, and empathy manipulations, in the next, that 
decrease support for redistribution among subsets of this small sample would likely have 




 In the first experiment, I manipulate subjects’ perceived similarity with recipients 
and then test if the predictive power of subjects’ of self-interest diverges across these 
perceptions. To manipulate subjects’ perceptions of commonality with welfare 
beneficiaries, sixty-four white college undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of 
the following two questions: 
 
Thinking for a moment of a group of poorer people who are very similar 
to you—who share many of your feelings, opinions, and ideas—to what 
extent do you support the redistribution of income from the rich to the 
poor? (1 to 5 scale) (n = 34) 
 
Thinking for a moment of a group of poorer people who are very different 
from you—who share few of your feelings, opinions, and ideas—to what 
extent do you support the redistribution of income from the rich to the 
poor? (1 to 5 scale) (n = 30) 
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 Unlike the measures of self-interest used in the analyses in the previous sections, 
which rely on income, the protocol in this experiment attempts to measure self-interest 
more directly. All subjects were asked the following question: “To what extent do you 
believe you might need government assistance, such as food stamps or unemployment 
benefits, in the next ten years?” Subjects could choose one of the following responses: 
Will definitely not need government assistance; most likely will not need government 
assistance; most likely will need government assistance; will definitely need government 
assistance. None of the sixty-four subjects chose “will definitely need government 
assistance.” Responses were coded from 0 (most likely will need assistance) to 2 (will 
definitely not need assistance).  
 This measure explicitly measures prospective self-interest by identifying those 
individuals who believe that they will need government assistance (a form of 
redistribution) in the near future and who, thus, have a strong interest to support 
redistribution from the rich to the poor. At the other end, the measure identifies those 
individuals who believe that they will not require assistance and, thus, would find it in 
their self-interest to oppose the redistribution from the rich to the poor. Importantly, 
subjects across the two groups expressed identical levels of self-interest, with those 
primed to consider more similar recipients expressing a mean degree of self-interest of 
1.18, and those who were primed to consider more dissimilar recipients expressed a 1.23 
mean of self-interest (t = -0.36, df = 57.23, p = 0.72).  
 If the theory introduced in this study is accurate, I expect to find that the measure 
for self-interest is negatively correlated with the measure capturing support for 
redistribution among subjects who were primed to consider more dissimilar recipients. 
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On the other hand, among those subjects primed to consider more similar recipients, we 
should not expect to find this negative correlation. These hypotheses are supported by the 
data. Among more-dissimilar subjects, redistributive attitudes and the self-interest 
measure are indeed negatively correlated (r = -0.33, p = 0.08); whereas among more-
similar subjects, we find a positive, though statistically insignificant, correlation (r = 
0.26, p = 0.14).  
 In addition to examining divergent correlations, I follow the method used in the 
preceding sections and model the interactive effect of perceptions and self-interest. Here 
the expectations are equally as clear. Individuals who find it in their self-interest to 
support redistribution will most likely do so whether or not they are primed to consider 
themselves similar or dissimilar from recipients. On the other hand, individuals who find 
it in their self-interest to oppose redistribution should be more likely to do so when they 
perceive similarities with recipients and much less likely when they perceive 
dissimilarities with the poor.  
 The results, displayed in Table 3.5 and graphically in Figure 3.1, largely 
substantiate these expectations. Whereas priming subjects to consider more 
dissimilar/similar recipients has no discernable effect among those subjects whose self-
interest leads them to favor redistribution, the effect is large among those whose self-
interest leads them to oppose redistribution, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 In other words, individuals whose self-interest dictates that they oppose 
redistribution will do so when they perceive they are dissimilar from recipients, but will 
waive their self-interested concerns by supporting redistribution that benefits more-
similar others. Individuals whose self-interest encourages them to support redistribution, 
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however, will do so regardless if they perceive that redistribution will go toward similar 




 In order to assess further the extent to which the effect of self-interest on people’s 
redistributive attitudes is conditioned on their perceptions of similarity vis-à-vis 
recipients, I fielded a second experiment. Instead of manipulating subjects’ perceptions of 
commonality with welfare recipients, the second experiment alters subjects’ self-interest. 
If the theory that self-interest matters only when individuals perceive that they share little 
in common with beneficiaries is true, then manipulating subjects’ self-interest should 
result in a change of redistributive attitudes only among those subjects who claimed to 
have little in common with the recipients. Conversely, changes in self-interest should not 
be associated with changes in redistributive attitudes among subjects who perceive 
themselves closer to welfare recipients. 
 In the fall of 2013, 213 undergraduate students participated in an online survey 
experiment.10 Subjects were first asked to identify the groups of people they feel 
particularly close to (see Figure 3.2). Following this, they were asked the inverse of the 
question; namely, to identify the groups they feel particularly far from. This method of 
measuring perceptions of commonality with welfare recipients, importantly, ensconces 
the target group (African Americans) within a larger list of social groups, which helps to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In total, 216 students participated; however, I exclude three subjects who chose that 
they “answered the questions with no thought and/or effort” in response to a post-test 
question designed to gauge subjects’ level of attentiveness. 
	  	   47	  
limit possible priming effects. The ordering of the groups in these first two questions was 
randomized across all subjects. These two questions would produce a measure of 
perceptions of commonality ranging 1 (close), 0 (neither close nor far—i.e. did not 
choose African Americans in either question), -1 (far).  
 Following the questions designed to measure perceptions of commonality, 
subjects were then asked three demographic-type questions in order to obfuscate further 
the purpose of the experiment.  
 After answering the filler questions, the computer randomly assigned the subjects 
to one of two groups. All subjects read the following fictional, though believable, 
information: “The number of people on food stamps is at record high. According to 
official estimates, roughly 8% of all whites and 28% of all African Americans receive 
food stamps.” However, subjects who were randomly assigned to the first group (Self-
Interest to Oppose) read the following: “The typical college graduate will never need 
food stamps, but should expect to pay more in taxes to keep the program running.” This 
manipulation leads the subject to believe that the chances s/he will need food stamps in 
the future are exceedingly low, but that the costs of the program will cut into their 
personal economic wellbeing. In other words, the manipulation is designed to trigger a 
self-interested opposition to the program. 
 Subjects assigned to the second group (Self-Interest to Favor) read the following: 
“Given the weak job market, the typical college graduate will need food stamps at some 
point within the first three years of graduating.” This prompt is designed to trigger self-
interest in support of the program.  
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 As such, this experiment’s self-interest manipulation should not be conceived of 
as self-interest/~self-interest, but rather self-interest to oppose/self-interest to favor. This 
allows for a more nuanced analysis of self-interest’s role in fomenting support/opposition 
for redistribution. Although discussions on self-interest’s role often focus on self-interest 
diluting the support for welfare by the rich, the discussion easily expands to encompass 
self-interest’s part in mobilizing support among the poor.  
 In terser terms, the reasoning put forth in this study suggests that the self-
interested poor should support redistribution even if they do not perceive that they share 
commonalities with those who find themselves in the same boat. Naturally, poor people 
who do perceive that they share commonalities with the poor can therefore support 
redistribution for both self-interest and group solidarity reasons, and it is likely that their 
support for welfare surpasses the support of the poor whose motivations are based solely 
upon their self-interest.  
 After the subjects read their respective prompts they were asked “To what extent 
do you support or oppose the food stamp program?” [strongly support (coded 4) to 
strongly oppose (coded 0)].  
 If it is true that self-interest effects attitudes about redistribution, but only when 
individuals perceive themselves to be different from recipients, I expect that the self-
interest manipulation induces a change in responses among those who earlier expressed 
that they feel they are particularly far, or different from, African Americans. The self-
interest manipulation should not be associated with any changes when we look at people 
who did not express that they feel far from African Americans.  
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 Table 3.6 shows that the OLS regression coefficient for the interaction between 
my pre-test measure of similarity and Self-Interest (Group 1 coded 1, Group 2 coded 0) is 
negative and approaches the traditional bounds of statistical significance.  
 Figure 3.3 shows the interaction in a manner more amenable to interpretation. 
Here, it is clear that, among subjects who perceive themselves to be closer to African 
Americans, it matters little if they find it in their personal self-interest to favor or oppose 
food stamps. In fact, the chances that individuals in this group supports redistribution 
remains virtually unchanged as we move from subjects who find it in their self-interest to 
support redistribution to subjects who should find it in their self-interest to oppose 
redistribution. This, clearly, is not a result that one would expect using the logic of 
traditional economists and political scientists who place self-interest at the center of their 
analysis. 
 On the other hand, among subjects who perceive themselves to be dissimilar from 
African Americans, support for food stamps is lower if they find it in their self-interest to 
oppose the program (i.e. it is unlikely they’ll ever need food stamps, but they will have to 
pay for the program) than if they find it in their self-interest to support the program (i.e. 
they might need it themselves in the short-term). These results are supportive of the 
hypothesis that self-interest matters when it comes to affecting support for redistribution, 
but it matters mostly (only) for those who perceive that they are dissimilar from 
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Conclusions 
 
 This chapter has assessed the extent to which individuals’ self-interest influence 
their attitudes about welfare redistribution from the rich to the poor. Although self-
interest commonly is used by pundits, academics, and laypeople alike to explain 
preferences toward redistribution, the evidence I presented in this chapter strongly 
suggests that self-interest’s role is heavily conditioned on people’s identifications with 
the poor. Contributing to work in psychology and experimental economics, I demonstrate 
that when individuals identify with the poor—i.e. when they perceive they share 
similarities—their conceptualization of the self expands and their material interests 
become less salient. It is only when people with means perceive that they are different 
from the poor that their self-interest gains importance in explaining their attitudes toward 
redistribution.  
 The evidence presented in this chapter sheds important light on the limitations of 
the classical view that welfare attitudes—and, by extension, welfare policies—are built 
upon citizens’ rational calculations of their self-interest. While it is true that some of the 
rich oppose redistribution because it cuts into their personal net worth, it is also the case 
that some wealthy citizens favor welfare programs because they sense a bound of 
commonality, or solidarity, with those who benefit from these programs.  
 It would appear that the poor support redistribution regardless of whether or not 
they identify with fellow recipients. In terms of the first experiment presented above, 
subjects who believed it was in their self-interest to support redistribution favored 
redistribution at equal rates when asked specifically about recipients who they perceived 
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as similar to themselves and different from themselves. In the second experiment, as 
shown in Figure 3, it appears that subjects who perceived themselves as far from 
recipients voiced less support for redistribution even when it was in their self-interest to 
support it, compared to subjects who both found it in their self-interest to support 
redistribution and who perceived similarities with recipients. Though this difference is 
not statistically significant, it does suggest that the redistributive attitudes of those in need 
are conditioned by perceptions of similarity just as are the attitudes of the wealthy.  
 Future work could easily build on and expand the experiments presented above. 
In addition to altering the manipulations—self-interest could be primed in a variety of 
ways—future experiments could attempt to manipulate both perceptions of similarity 
with welfare recipients and subjects’ degree of self-interest. Given the small n available 
using undergraduate subject pools as utilized in the above experiments, I was unable to 
include multiple manipulations in one design.  
 Based on the evidence presented in this chapter, it appears that people who 
perceive that they share commonalities with welfare recipients consistently support 
redistribution regardless of their self-interest. This initial evidence suggests that though 
the attitudes of people who find it in their self-interest to support redistribution can be 
diminished if they perceive they are different from other recipients, the attitudes of 
individuals who perceive that they share similarities with welfare recipients is not 
moderated by their self-interest. As discussed, future work is necessary to test the 
resilience of this claim, but the following chapter will explore how another important 
factor—empathy—conditions attitudes, not of those who perceive that they are different 
from, but of those who perceive that they are similar to recipients. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 3.1 ANES 1996       
Model           
Intercept     4.05*** 
Income*Dissimilarity    0.001 
Similarity/Dissimilarity   -0.25a 
Income     -0.05 
Sex     -0.15 
Age      0.005 
n      949 
adj. R2      0.20    
Party fixed-effects not shown. a Similarity reverse coded 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
 
Table 3.2 BSAS 2009      
Model         
Intercept     2.60*** 
Income*Dissimilarity                -0.01** 
Dissimilarity    0.07a 
Income     0.02 
Sex     0.04 
Age      0.02 
n      749 
adj. R2     0.13    
Party fixed-effects not shown. a Similarity reverse coded 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 3.3 BSAS 2009        
Model   Overall   Group 1  Group 2   
Intercept    2.14***   1.88***   1.92*** 
Income*Dissimilarity     0.0003  -0.01** 
Dissimilarity              -0.12*** -0.10*  -0.06* 
Income    0.02***   0.03   0.08**  
Sex    0.01   0.17  -0.15** 
Age   -0.01  -0.02  -0.08 
Occupation Type   0.14** 
n     810   382   428 
adj. R2    0.20   0.20   0.20   
Party fixed-effects not shown.   
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Table 3.4 EVS 2008      
          
Intercept     6.80*** 
Income*Dissimilarity  -0.09*** 
Similarity/Dissimilarity   0.11a 
Income    -0.11*** 
Immigrant   -0.34* 
Ideology   -0.12*** 
Age      0.003** 
Sex    -0.10** 
n    39,700 
adj. R2      0.15    
Models run with clustered standard errors. 
Country fixed-effects not shown. 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
a Similarity reverse coded 
 
Table 3.5 Similarity and Self-Interest, small-n survey experiment 1  
Intercept     3.41*** 
Self-Interest    -0.49 
Similarity Condition  -0.59 
Self-Interest * Similarity   1.00* 
adj. R2     0.11     
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05  
 
Table 3.6 Similarity and Self-Interest, small-n survey experiment 2  
Intercept     2.83*** 
Self-Interest    -0.008 
Similarity Condition  -0.12 
Self-Interest * Similarity  -0.60+ 
adj. R2     0.04     






















































   
Two Versions of Empathy  
 
 In contrast to the Hobbesian view of the world promulgated by adherents to the 
Meltzer-Richard model, as outlined in previous chapters, other researchers have turned to 
altruism and feelings of empathy to explain why some individuals behave prosocially 
even at the expense of their pure self-interest (see Batson & Powell 2003 for a recent 
review).  
  Altruism is “the motivation to increase another person’s welfare” (Batson & 
Powell 2003). The nature of altruism is a much-studied and occasionally controversial 
topic in social psychology; however, the preponderance of evidence strongly suggests 
that many individuals do act altruistically, or prosocially, at the expense of their self-
interest in a variety of contexts (Batson & Powell 2003). As understood in the 
psychological literature, the empathy-altruism hypothesis holds that empathy sparks 
individuals to act altruistically. Although this argument finds general acceptance, 
researchers are sharply divided into two camps when it comes to conceptualizing 
empathy. On the one side of the divide, empathy is understood as the result of a cognitive 
process whereby an individual takes a moment to consider the views and/or feelings of 
the empathy-inducing individual or group (e.g. Finley & Stephan 2000). This 
conceptualization is closest to lay usages of empathy, but it has its flaws. Mainly, the 
cognitive conceptualization places a high burden on empathy by stipulating that, in order 
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to be empathetic, individuals must undertake the possibly grueling task of imagining the 
world from other people’s perspectives. Though research studies and lived experience 
suggests that human beings do—or at least can—take the time to step back and think 
about life from another’s perspective, researchers in the other camp argue that, as 
opposed to being the result of a cognitive process, empathy is “an other-oriented 
emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another person” (Batson & 
Powell 2003, p. 463, 474). This emotive conceptualization suggests that people are 
capable of feeling empathy without stepping into anyone else’s shoes and fits real world 
instances of empathetic feeling when individuals are faced with situation where help is 
needed sooner than empathy can be cognitively processed.   
 In actuality, empathy probably has both cognitive and emotive foundations: 
Individuals can become empathetic toward a fellow individual by thinking for a moment 
of that other’s perspective, or empathy may be the result of an emotional shock that spurs 
the individual into action before explicit cognition takes place. In any case, research 
demonstrates that empathy motivates people to behave altruistically toward (Krebs 1975; 
Stürmer et al. 2006) and help (Hornstein 1978; Batson et al., 1981) others, specifically 
when those others are perceived as similar.  
 Perceptions of similarity remain important regardless of the conceptualization of 
empathy to which one wishes to adhere. These perceptions provide the basis on which the 
cognitive conceptualization is built: Individuals who perceive that they are similar to each 
other should have a very easy time indeed imagining each other’s perspectives, thoughts, 
and feelings. On the other side of the conceptual divide, perceptions of similarity should 
ease the degree to which emotional appeals are registered, as the welfare of similar others 
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is of more direct relevance to individuals relative to the welfare of dissimilar others 
(Stürmer et al. 2006).  
 Recent work by Dimick, Rueda, and Stegmuller (2014) has brought attention to 
the relationship between altruism and empathy on the one hand and support for 
redistribution on the other. In their working paper, the team examines why richer 
Americans voice stronger support for redistribution in some places over others. They 
argue that rich Americans are moved by altruistic motives to support redistribution in 
highly unequal U.S. states. By extension, according to this line of reasoning, rich 
Americans living in more equal states are not eyewitnesses to the plight of poverty and 
therefore are not compelled to support welfare programs. While this argument might 
make intuitive sense, Dimick et al. do not include a measure of altruism in their statistical 
models, and thus are forced to assume what mechanisms are at play in compelling 
wealthier Americans living in more unequal states to support redistribution. Indeed, it 
could just as likely be the case, based on their analysis, that richer Americans living in 
unequal states fear uprisings or revolutions and thus support redistribution from a purely 
self-interested standpoint. Without including a measure for altruism or empathy, 
researchers are unable to conclude that these factors matter.  
 Furthermore, I should note that Dimick et al.’s (2014) argument that rich 
Americans are compelled to empathize or behave altruistically toward the poor in more 
unequal states relative to rich Americans living in more equal states does not fit well 
within the theory of perceptions of similarity put forward in this study. Based on the 
theory forwarded here, I would hypothesize that rich Americans living in less equal states 
would perceive themselves to be less similar than the poor than rich Americans living in 
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more equal states, as economic inequality correlates with—if not causes—a host of 
divergent lifestyle, health, educational, occupational, and social differences (Wilkinson & 
Pickett 2010). Perceptions of dissimilarity in these unequal states should then limit the 
room for empathy or altruism to take root. Unfortunately, as Dimick et al.’s data do not 
include a measure of empathy or altruism, this issue remains unresolved for the time 
being. Nonetheless, the evidence I present in this chapter lends credence to my argument 
that perceptions of similarity are vital in determining among whom empathy triggers 
support for redistribution. 
 In this chapter, I test the effects of empathy more directly than existing studies 
have done. In doing so, I demonstrate that support among individuals who perceive that 
they do share similarities with beneficiaries can be—and is—motivated by empathy. 
Survey data of the variety used by Dimick et al. (2014) is not conducive to testing this 
relationship for a number of reasons. First and foremost, no national or cross-national 
survey that I am aware of has asked respondents pertinent questions about their level of 
altruism or empathy toward welfare recipients. This is hardly surprising, given the 
difficulty—if not impossibility—of capturing empathy on a questionnaire. For this 
reason, the data I use to test the relationship between empathy and redistributive attitudes 
come from two original experiments I fielded at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign in 2013 and 2014.  
 The use of experiments in studies of empathy is neither particularly novel nor 
controversial. Indeed, a number of existing studies in political science and related fields 
have manipulated subjects’ empathy experimentally to gauge empathy’s effects on 
helping and redistributive behavior (Feldman et al. 2014). What is novel is that the 
	  	   60	  
current study contributes to these existing studies by examining how empathy’s effects 
differ between those who share an underlying sense of identification with welfare 
recipients and those who do not. The first experiment manipulates empathy emotively, 
while the second is a test of cognitive empathy. In addition, the second experiment I 
present shows how experimental empathy manipulations may have a tendency to elicit 
socially desirable responses—particularly among those who do not identify with 
recipients—while leaving feelings of empathy themselves untouched.   
 
 




 The evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that self-interest 
motivates redistributive attitudes among different types of individuals in society—
namely, self-interest is important to individuals who do not perceive that they share 
commonalities with welfare beneficiaries. Based on the theory in the previous section, 
however, I expect that empathetic appeals should spark support for welfare among some 
individuals who do perceive that they are similar to those in need.  
 In order to test this hypothesis, I designed an experiment that manipulates the 
degree of respondents’ empathy toward recipients in a manner wherein subjects are not 
explicitly induced to think of themselves in the others’ shoes. Instead, this experiment 
attempts to manipulate subjects’ empathy emotionally. The manipulation allows for 
empathy to occur automatically, without much thought. Indeed, the speed at which most 
subjects completed the experiment strongly suggests that few, if any, individuals 
pondered over any of the questions or the manipulation. Overall, the design was crafted 
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to allow me to demonstrate that increasing or decreasing respondents’ empathy for 
recipients results in greater change in support for redistribution among those who feel 
similar to recipients compared to those who feel dissimilar to recipients. 
 The survey experiment was administered in a university computer lab, and eighty-
eight college undergraduates participated.11 As in the previous chapter, the attitudinal 
results are not intended to be generalizable to any larger population. Instead, the focus 
here is on the extent to which the effects of empathy—both emotive and cognitive—on 
redistributive attitudes are conditional on perceptions of similarity.  
 First, all respondents were asked the following: “Here is a list of groups. Please 
read over the list and select which groups you feel particularly close to—people who are 
most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things. Select as many as 
apply.” The groups were: poor people, whites, uneducated people, business people, 
members of your immediate family, Americans, the elderly, African Americans, young 
people, the rich, Christians, people who lost their jobs, the unemployed, atheists, all 
humans, Hispanics, middle-class people, children, educated people, Muslims, and people 
who quite their jobs. 
 Next, they were then shown an identical question asking them to check the groups 
they felt particularly far from. These questions are identical to the ones used in the second 
self-interest experiment in Chapter Three. As I explained above, the questions capture 
respondents’ feelings toward African Americans in an inconspicuous manner by 
including African Americans in a longer list of various groups. Again, the ordering of the 
groups was randomized across all subjects. From these two questions, I created a measure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This n represents the number of participants once African American participants were 
excluded. 
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of their perceived distance specifically to African Americans. Individuals who chose that 
they were close to African Americans were assigned a 2 (n = 7), those who chose that 
they were far from African Americans were assigned 0 (n = 31), and those who chose 
neither that they were close to nor far from African Americans were assigned a 1 (n = 
50).  
 Following these questions, respondents were randomly assigned one of three 
versions of the same question, designed to manipulate respondents’ empathy toward the 
recipients. Manipulating empathy emotively, of course, is not a straightforward matter. 
Most, if not all, empathy manipulations in the existing experimental literature fall under 
the cognitive approach. A review of the larger empathy literature, however, revealed one 
promising method of manipulating empathy emotionally. Specifically, a number of works 
strongly suggests that people are more empathetic toward down-on-their-luck individuals 
who are not responsible for their plight than they are toward those who are responsible 
(McDonell, 1993; Batson et al. 1997; Bécares & Turner 2004). This literature focuses 
largely on individuals’ feelings of empathy toward those diagnosed with AIDS, though I 
believe the insight is generalizable. Other studies induce empathy by asking subjects 
directly to consider the feelings or emotions of the victim in question (e.g. Finlay & 
Stephan 2000). I believe, however, that inducing empathy by assigning responsibility or 
blame more closely mirrors how empathy is sparked emotionally in the real world. 
Moreover, asking subjects to consider the feelings and emotions of others is akin to the 
cognitive, as opposed to emotive, conceptualization of empathy. Building on this work, I 
manipulate empathy emotively by distinguishing between people who lose their jobs 
(high empathy condition) and that those who quit their jobs (low empathy condition).  
	  	   63	  
 The first version represents a “control,” in that no empathetic-inducing 
information is included: “To what extent do you support a portion of your tax money 
going to programs that contribute assistance to unemployed African Americans? 1 strong 
oppose to 5 strongly support” (n = 33). The second version of the question is designed to 
make respondents feel less empathetic toward recipients: “To what extent do you support 
a portion of your tax money going to programs that contribute assistance to unemployed 
African Americans who quit their jobs?” (n = 28). The third version, on the other hand, is 
designed to induce respondents to feel empathetic toward recipients: “To what extent do 
you support a portion of your tax money going to programs that contribute assistance to 
unemployed African Americans who lost their jobs?” (n = 27).  
 In the first part of the analysis, I examine if these different versions of the 
question elicited different answers depending on respondents’ pre-existing perceptions of 
similarity to African Americans. Given the low n, here I pool respondents who felt close 
to African Americans and who felt neither close nor far from African Americans. Based 
on the hypothesis, I expect that respondents who perceive themselves to be dissimilar 
from African Americans will express similar levels of (low) support for redistribution 
across the three conditions.  
 On the other hand, I expect the other respondents to express variability across the 
three conditions. Specifically, the difference between those who perceive similarities in 
the high-empathy condition should be most supportive of redistribution, whereas those 
randomly assigned to the low-empathy condition should be least supportive. The first two 
figures, which present the group means with 95% confidence intervals, show that this is 
precisely what occurs. In Figure 4.1, we see that inducing low or high levels of 
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empathetic feelings vis-à-vis welfare recipients does not alter the redistributive attitudes 
of individuals who perceive that they share no similarities with these recipients.  
 The picture changes, however, turning to Figure 4.2. It appears that empathetic 
feelings have more power to sway attitudes among those who perceive that they share 
similarities with the recipients in question. Here, respondents in the high-empathy 
condition were substantively (and nearly statistically)12 more likely to support 
redistribution than their counterparts in the low-empathy condition. Moreover, these 
respondents also show slightly higher support for redistribution than their counterparts in 
the control condition. 
 I additionally run a model, using OLS regression, wherein respondents’ pre-
existing perceptions of similarities with African Americans is interacted with their 
placement in either high or low-empathy conditions. When individuals perceive that they 
are similar to recipients and when they are provided with empathy-inducing information 
(such as the fact that the recipient lost his or her job), I expect to see an increase in 
support for redistribution. I limit my attention only to those in either the low (coded 1) or 
high-empathy (coded 2) conditions in order to hone in on the effects of empathy. 
 As presented in Table 4.1, the results support the hypothesis that when individuals 
who perceive that they share similarities with the recipients in question are induced to 
feel empathetic toward the recipients, their support for redistribution increases. Figure 4.3 
plots the interaction, again showing that the empathy manipulation affected the attitudes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ANOVA analysis, not shown, reveals that the difference in means between the high-
empathy and low-empathy conditions among those who perceive they are similar to 
recipients is significant at p = 0.06. 
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of those who perceived themselves close to African Americans and not the attitudes of 
those who perceived African Americans as dissimilar. 
 
 
Experiment 2: Cognitive Empathy 
 
 
 In the second experiment, using a separate pool of student subjects, I manipulated 
empathy in line with its cognitive conceptualization. After they were asked identical 
questions to measure their perceived similarities to African Americans, subjects were 
asked a set of demographic questions before being randomly assigned to one of two 
groups. Subjects assigned to the first, or control, group were asked the following: “To 
what extent do you support a portion of your tax money going to programs that contribute 
assistance to unemployed African Americans?” [5 possible responses ranging from 
strongly oppose to strongly support].  
 Subjects assigned to the treatment group were asked the identical question but, in 
addition, were told “Before you answer, if possible please take a moment to consider 
yourself in an unemployed African American’s position.” This manipulation adheres 
strictly to the cognitive conceptualization of empathy by asking subjects to consider the 
others’ perspective.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the mean response levels between control and treatment 
subjects, subdivided by their perceived similarities to African Americans as measured by 
the pre-test questions (Far, n = 83; Middle, n = 191; Close, n = 31).   
 As illustrated in Figure 4.4, it appears that the empathy manipulation elicited a 
similar effect among subjects in each subgroup—in fact, those who according to their 
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pre-test measures professed the greatest dissimilarity from African Americans were 
affected the greatest by the empathy manipulation, which is a direct contradiction of the 
hypothesis that empathy most strongly effects those who perceive that they are close to 
welfare recipients. These results suggest this expectation requires a degree of refining; 
however, they do not allow for the outright rejection of the theory.  
 First, it is possible that individuals who feel particularly close to a given group of 
individuals have reached the empathetic ceiling, at least the cognitive empathetic ceiling. 
Furthermore, individuals who identify strongly with recipients may have a pre-existing 
high degree of empathy for recipients. In fact, the data show that pre-test perceptions of 
commonality with African Americans correlates highly with post-test expressions of 
empathetic feelings toward African Americans.  
 Because they identify with African Americans, subjects in this subset may 
automatically consider the perspective of unemployed African Americans: The cognitive 
treatment changes nothing. Therefore, one should not expect great differences between 
similarly-identifying subjects in control and treatment conditions. As shown in Figure 4, 
it is between strongly (Close) identifying subjects that I find the smallest differences 
between mean Treatment and Control responses. A more troubling possibility brings the 
conceptual, or at least operational, distinction between cognitive empathy and 
identification into question. Future work must assess the extent to which manipulations 
that prompt subjects to cognitively empathize with others simultaneously induces 
subjects to identify with said others.  
 But what about those who feel farthest from African Americans? According to the 
results in Figure 4.4, the empathy treatment caused a spike of support for redistribution 
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among this subset. I argue, however, that this spike is the result of a phenomenon other 
than empathy. Near the end of the experiment, subjects were asked the following 
question: “To what extent do you feel empathetic towards members of the following 
groups?” Among the target groups, subjects were asked their feelings toward African 
Americans [strongly do not empathize, do not empathize, empathize, strongly 
empathize].  
 Figure 4.5 shows that the treatment affected the empathetic feelings only among 
subjects who were identified as being neither very close to nor very far from African 
Americans pre-test.13 As suggested in the preceding paragraph, subjects who closely 
identified with African Americans pre-test expressed high levels of empathy toward 
African Americans post-test, regardless of their assignment to treatment or control. 
Similarly, subjects who selected African Americans as a group to which they felt 
particularly far from in the pre-test expressed relatively low levels of empathy toward 
African Americans post-test regardless of treatment.  
 What, then, explains the apparent effect of treatment on the redistributive attitudes 
of subjects who perceive they share no commonalities with African Americans? At least 
two possibilities come to mind, the first somewhat more idealistic and unlikelier than the 
second. It may be the case that when subjects in this subgroup are asked to think for a 
moment of the plight of unemployed African Americans, they find that they are not so 
dissimilar after all. This would explain the surge in support for redistribution, but if it 
were the case, I would also expect a surge in empathetic feelings toward blacks. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The means in this subset were 2.66 (Control) and 2.85 (Treatment), t = -2.17, df = 
177.20, p = 0.03. Differences between Control and Treatment in the other subgroups 
were statistically insignificant.  
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second possibility is that the group of subjects who perceived no commonality with 
African Americans and who were placed in treatment modify their preferences to accord 
with what they believe are socially desirable responses.  
  Though the current experimental design does not allow me to test explicitly for 
social desirability effects, it does allow me to probe if assignment to treatment changed 
how individuals behaved in their capacity as subjects. If treatment elicited socially 
desirable responses among those who do not identify with African Americans, I should 
expect to find that the treatment instrument prompted these individuals to behave in a 
way that would safeguard their true opinions.  
 In other words, these individuals should have extended more effort responding to 
the questions than their counterparts who were randomly assigned to treatment, as greater 
effort would be needed in order to ensure that their responses were in line with those they 
believed were socially desirable. To test this possibility, I turn to the last question: “As a 
quality check, please mark which of the following describes your participation in this 
survey. Your answer will remain anonymous and will not effect your extra credit” [I 
answered the questions with no thought and/or effort; I answered…with some thought 
and/or effort; I answered…with much thought and/or effort]. 
 The evidence presented in Figure 4.6 lends credence to this suggestion. 
Individuals who identified as dissimilar from blacks, and were placed in the control 
condition, did not seem to extend much effort in answering the questionnaire. When 
subjects of the same subgroup were placed in the treatment condition, however, effort 
appears to have shot up to mirror all other participants. Although this jump could be 
explained by other factors, I argue that it is most likely to be the case that these 
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individuals extended more energy than they normally would have because they were on 
high alert to answer the questions in a socially desirable manner.  
 Future work should explore these admittedly ad hoc explanations further. While 
more work must be done regarding the distinction between identification with and 
cognitive empathy with others, as discussed above, it might be relatively easier to 
disentangle the effects of cognitive empathy manipulations and social desirability effects 
on the opinions of those who perceive that they are far from African Americans in future 
studies. For instance, it might be feasible to manipulate cognitive empathy more subtly, 
which, in turn, would potentially decrease the prevalence of social desirability 
motivations. Another option would be to develop an indirect measure of people’s support 
for redistribution to African Americans (Fisher 1993). For example, more general 
questions that do not explicitly mention African Americans may be used to gauge 
people’s support for redistribution. This may reduce social desirability by obscuring the 
link between the cognitive empathy manipulation and the question measuring the 





 The results presented in this chapter support the hypothesis that feelings of 
empathy can play an important role in promoting support for programs of redistribution. 
Furthermore, the findings contribute to our understanding of group identity’s relationship 
with redistributive attitudes. Whereas extant studies examine the direct effect group 
identifications have on people’s attitudes, the fact of the matter remains that even those 
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who identify with welfare recipients may have reason to voice diminished support for 
redistribution—or, to put it conversely, those who perceive that they share commonalities 
with recipients may be spurred by additional factors to increase their support for the 
redistribution of income or wealth from the rich to the poor.  
 An important example of such a factor is empathy. As described above, 
empathetic concerns can take root in emotional or cognitive processes and induces people 
to extend assistance to those in need. The two experiments in this chapter demonstrated 
how these two processes work to affect subjects’ attitudes toward welfare redistribution. 
In the first experiment, the effect of empathy, as conceived emotively, had a stark effect 
on the attitudes of those people who perceived themselves as close to recipients. The 
second experiment suggested that the effects of cognitively manipulating empathy are 
more circumspect.  
 I argue that the results of the second experiment are due to the likelihood that 
individuals who perceive that they share similarities with others already have a built-in 
sense of cognitive empathy—they already think, or have thought, about what life’s like in 
the other’s shoes, and having them do so again in an experimental setting elicits little to 
no change in their attitudes. Among individuals who see some, but not too many, 
similarities linking them and recipients, activating empathy cognitively results in a larger 
increase in support for redistribution. 
  The effect of empathy, as predicted, is relegated to those who perceive that the 
share commonalities, or at least some commonalities, with recipients. Individuals who do 
not perceive that they share a bond to those in need have neither the cognitive willingness 
(or perhaps ability) to consider the other’s perspective nor the foundation on which 
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emotive empathetic appeals can find resonance. The evidence presented in this and the 
previous chapter suggests that these individuals may be motivated to support 
redistribution out of self-interested concerns, but the power of group-based motivations to 
catalyze a change in attitudes is limited, if not chimerical. 
  




Table 4.1 Similarity and Empathy, small-n survey experiment  
Intercept     3.00*** 
Empathy Condition   -0.46 
Perceived Similarities  -0.48 
Empathy * Similarities   1.31* 
adj. R2     0.09    
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Chapter 5 
 




 As previous chapters have shown, matters of self-interest and empathy matter in 
determining individuals’ redistributive attitudes, but the importance of these factors is 
contingent on individuals’ underlying perceptions of similarity with welfare recipients. 
Redistribution is one of the most important issues in polities worldwide—economic 
redistribution is the essence of politics classically defined as “who gets what, where, and 
when.” Because redistribution is at the heart of politics, we should expect that the factors 
important to understanding citizens’ redistributive attitudes also enlighten other political 
attitudes and behaviors.   
 Moreover, this chapter attempts to demonstrate the political relevance of earlier 
chapters’ findings. If people hold pro-redistribution attitudes, but support traditionally 
anti-redistribution parties, then this study’s findings shed very little light on the 
relationship between perceptions of commonality and politics proper. If, on the other 
hand, perceptions of similarity exert similar influence over both redistributive attitudes 
and party support, 14 then these perceptions should be afforded greater attention by both 
political scientists and policymakers. In order to capture the extent to which this is true, 
the current chapter moves from examining the effect perceptions of similarity exert on 
attitudinal outcomes to explore how these perceptions influence political behavior 
directly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I use the terms “party support,” “party identification,” and “partisanship” 
interchangeably throughout. 
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 In line with the preceding chapters, the focus here is not on the direct relationship 
between perceptions of commonality and partisanship. Nor is the focus on the direct 
relationship between self-interest and partisanship. Instead, I focus on how perceptions of 
similarity with the poor condition the influence of self-interest on party support. 
Although empathy is less commonly—never?—used to explain or predict citizens’ 
partisanship, as I detail more below theorists have long held that self-interest is vital in 
understanding partisanship. The assumption of the economic, rational voter, undergirds 
both Meltzer and Richards’ (1981) claims on the size of government, but also many other 
theories of voter behavior. Yet, as previous chapters have demonstrated, people are only, 
or at least primarily, self-interested insofar as they feel isolated or different from those in 
their community.  
 The question this chapter seeks to answer is if perceptions of similarity with the 
poor mitigate the relationship between self-interest and political party support as they do 
self-interest’s relationship with redistributive attitudes. In other words, do perceptions of 
similarity with the poor spur wealthier citizens to minimize or ignore their self-interest 
and, by extension, vote for parties that support redistribution? 
 This chapter will demonstrate that perceptions of similarity which link the rich to 
the poor condition not only attitudes about redistribution, but condition also the extent to 
which the rich support political parties that favor redistribution to the poor. Using data 
from the 2009 British Social Attitudes Survey and the 1996 American National Election 
Study,15 I demonstrate that the rich forego their self-interest and voice support for parties 
on the left when they perceive similarities with recipients of redistribution. As the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These surveys are the only ones of those analyzed in earlier chapter that include 
adequate measures of respondents’ party support.  
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literature on economic voting would suggest, however, self-interest motivates the rich to 
support parties on the right in the absence of these perceptions.  
 
Parties and Economic Redistribution 
  
 The link between party support and redistributive politics is engrained in the 
literature. The Meltzer and Richard (1981) study discussed at multiple times in previous 
chapters models people’s preferences for redistribution as a function of their income; 
their findings translate redistributive preferences directly into party (or candidate) 
preferences. This argument fares relatively well in political science literature on 
pocketbook voting (Lewis-Beck 1985), wherein citizens’ economic situation explains 
their political behavior. However, most studies have found little empirical evidence of 
this linkage (Feldman 1982; Sigelman et al. 1991). Feldman (1982) argues that economic 
individualism negates the effect of people’s economic situation on their vote choice, 
economic individualists take full responsibility for their plight (or success), not 
politicians. Sears and Lau (1983) find that the apparent correlation between survey 
respondents’ economic situation and their political opinions is an artifact of survey 
instruments themselves due to question placement: When questions regarding the 
economy are asked prior to political preference questions, surveys “personalize” political 
preferences by making respondents’ economic situation salient. On the other hand, when 
political questions are asked prior to economic ones, surveys tend to “politicize” 
respondents’ economic situations by making salient their political preferences.  
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 The debate concerning the relationship between people’s economic situation and 
their political preferences, which began decades ago, is ongoing. Although Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier insist that “[e]conomic conditions shape election outcomes in the world’s 
democracies” because voters heavily weigh economic matters when holding governments 
responsible, economic voting models appear to be “contingent” insofar as institutional 
and individual-level factors impede a direct relationship between economics and voting 
behavior (Anderson 2007). For instance, in muddled institutional contexts citizens may 
not be able to assign blame for poor economic performance to a party or incumbent; 
relatedly, individuals may not have the information or the cognitive abilities to link 
economic performance to political decisions. Duch and Stevenson (2006) also call into 
question the strong assertion that economics determines voting behavior with their 
finding that the relationship between economics and voting varies across time and across 
countries. 
 Building on the work that highlights the contingent and variable nature of 
economic voting, what if much like people’s attitudes toward redistribution, the 
relationship between economic self-interest and party preference was provisional on 
people’s perceptions of commonality with others? Because welfare redistribution is 
among the primary issues in partisan politics in industrialized democracies, one might 
expect—much in line with the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model—that the richer favor 
parties of the right that oppose redistribution, whereas the poorer vote for parties of the 
left that support welfare. However, based on the theory and evidence presented in the 
previous chapters, one might hypothesize that the rich will support parties of the left 
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when they perceive that they share commonalities with those who benefit from 
redistribution.  
 This chapter tests this hypothesis using survey data from the United Kingdom and 
the United States—two countries where redistribution is a highly contentious political 
issue even though the scale of redistribution falls below that found in other industrialized 
democracies.  
 
Labour, Liberals, and Conservatives 
  
 In the United Kingdom, the political left consists of two parties: Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats. Whereas the Liberal Democrats are generally seen as more socially 
liberal, progressive, and supportive of the welfare state, the Labour Party is considered 
the more centrist, “big tent” party of the left—a position that was concretized with the 
advent of “New Labour” under Tony Blair. On the right, the Conservatives tout free 
market principles and campaign on and implement policies to reduce the number of state 
benefits claimants and to enforce austerity in state spending.  
 The Meltzer and Richard model assumes a two-party system, and although the 
UK is often considered to have a de-facto two party system, with the Conservatives and 
Labour the most powerful, reality is a bit more complex. For instance, though the Liberal 
Democrats currently hold less than 9% of the seats in the House of Commons, the party 
received 23% of the vote in the 2010 elections, compared to the 29% and the 36.1% 
garnered by Labour and the Conservatives, respectively (BBC News 2010). Furthermore, 
despite their differences, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition 
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government in the wake of the 2010 elections—the first in the post-war period. 
Nonetheless, based on the economic voting literature, as well as the precepts of the 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) model, one would suspect that wealthier voters in Britain 
vote predominantly for the Conservatives, whereas less wealthy voters vote for parties of 
the left.  
 However, according to the arguments offered above, an important factor in 
determining self-interest’s influence on partisanship is an individual’s perception of 
commonality with beneficiaries of the state’s largesse. Thus, we should expect that 
wealthier voters in the United Kingdom favor parties of the left when they perceive they 
share commonalities with welfare recipients. In the data used in this chapter—as well as 
in the preceding chapters—perceived commonalities with welfare recipients in the UK is 
gauged by the extent to which survey respondents felt similar to immigrants. Wealthier 
citizens who do not perceive that they share commonalities with welfare recipients should 
be more likely to behave in line with models of economic voting—that is, they should 
support the Conservatives, who wish to limit taxation and state spending.  
 The dependent variable in the first part of the analysis captures people’s 
probability of favoring Labour (measured as 1) versus their probability of favoring the 
Conservative party (measured 0), and is derived from a question on the 2009 BSAS 
asking respondents “If there was a general election tomorrow, which political party do 
you think you would be most likely to support?”16 Using a logit model, I control for age 
and sex, as older individuals and males are more likely to favor parties of the right than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Supporters of other parties are dropped from the analysis in order to provide for a 
comparison between the major parties that generally favor (Labour) and oppose 
(Conservatives) welfare redistribution. 
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are younger people and females. I also control for education using fixed effects, though 
the variable is omitted from the tables for visual purposes. The independent variables of 
interest are income, which is reverse-coded and labeled “Poor,” and perceptions of 
similarity with fellow recipients, which is measured as perceptions toward immigrants 
and also is reverse-coded and labeled “Dissimilar.”  
 Based on the theory above, we should expect the poor to favor Labour. We should 
also suspect that respondents who feel dissimilar from recipients favor the Conservatives. 
However, we should further expect that Labour can count on the support of the wealthy 
when the wealthy perceive that they share similarities with those in need.  
 Table 5.1 shows the probability of Labour’s success over the conservatives in 
garnering votes from respondents one standard deviation above (Rich) and one standard 
deviation below (Poor) the median income. As expected, the Poor consistently favor 
Labour over the Conservatives, regardless of their perceptions toward fellow welfare 
recipients. The attitudes of the Rich, however, are conditional upon their perceptions of 
similarity (or dissimilarity) with beneficiaries, as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 In short, looking first at the two main parties in British politics, I find initial 
support for the hypothesis that Labour can successfully capture the support of wealthier 
citizens when those citizens perceive that they share commonalities with welfare 
recipients. However, as these perceptions recede, the probability that Labour will capture 
the wealthy’s support also declines. Regardless of perceptions, the relatively less wealthy 
support Labour nine times out of ten. Given the centrist nature of Labour, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that though the interaction between perceptions of similarity and personal 
income leans in the expected direction, it is not statistically significant.  
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 An additional test of the hypothesis can be performed by analyzing the differences 
in support between the rich and the poor for the combined left (Labour and Liberal 
Democrats coded as 1) versus the Conservatives (coded 0), and indeed, a stronger 
relationship in support of the hypothesis is found when comparing support for these two 
groupings (see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2) Here, wealthier individuals’ probability of 
supporting the left is roughly 0.85 when they perceive that they share similarities with 
welfare recipients. However, as perceptions of similarity decrease, so too does the 
probability among the wealthy to support the left over the Conservatives—falling to 0.60. 
That this relationship is crisper when limiting the analysis to supporters of either the two 
parties of the left or the Conservatives is hardly surprising, considering that the 
distinction between the two parties in terms of welfare state politics is starker than that 
between Labour on its own and the Conservatives.  
 
Democrats and Republicans 
 
 Moving to the United States, the story is very similar. Although support for 
aspects of the limited American welfare state, such as Social Security, could be found 
across the political spectrum for most of the post-war period, following the Reagan 
administration, few could ignore the Republican Party’s aspirations to further curtail 
welfare spending (Pierson 1991). Although Democratic leaders, such as Bill Clinton in 
1996, are hardly staunch bulwarks of generous welfare spending, of the two dominant 
American political parties, the Democrats typically are more supportive of welfare and 
redistribution generally. Thus, I hypothesize that relatively poorer Americans should 
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exhibit a higher probability of supporting the Democratic Party regardless of their 
perceptions of similarity—or sense of solidarity—with welfare recipients. Wealthier 
Americans, on the other hand, should support the Democratic Party specifically when 
they perceive they share commonalities with the poor. Among wealthier Americans who 
do not hold these perceptions, the probability of supporting the Democrats should be 
much lower.  
 In order to test these hypotheses, I return to the 1996 American National Election 
Study introduced in earlier chapters. I use a seven-point measure of partisanship, where 0 
is used to code strong Republicans and 6, strong Democrats. As in the case above, I 
control for education (the educated typically lean to the left), age (older Americans skew 
to the right), and gender (males skew to the right).  
 The interaction estimated using OLS, the results of which are shown in Table 5.3, 
lends support to the hypotheses regarding perceptions of similarity’s conditioning 
influence on self-interest. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, relatively poorer respondents 
generally lean Democratic, regardless of their sense of similarity with other poor 
Americans. This finding, it should be noted, does not grow out of the fact that poor 
Americans do not identify with other poor Americans. Because I use a measure of 
people’s perceived similarities specifically with African Americans—who are perceived 
as the prototypical welfare recipients in the U.S. (Gilens 1999)—a large number of both 
wealthy and poorer respondents voiced no sense of commonality with blacks.  
 Relatively wealthier Americans follow a very different path. Wealthy Americans 
who identify with the poor are supportive of the Democrats—in fact, their support for the 
Democrats slightly, though not significantly, surpasses the support the Democratic Party 
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enjoys from poorer Americans. As expected, however, support for the Democrats falls 
precipitously when we turn our attention to wealthy Americans who perceive fewer 
similarities with the poor. Wealthy Americans who do not perceive they are bound to the 
poor are, as we would expect, highly unlikely to support the Democrats who are more 
likely to extend government benefits to the disadvantaged. It is in their self-interest to 
support the party (the Republican Party) that protects their wealth from expropriation and 




 The results presented in this chapter highlight the important role of perceptions of 
similarities that link contributors and beneficiaries of welfare. Not only do these 
perceptions condition self-interest’s ability to affect attitudes about redistribution, they 
also condition self-interest’s influence on party preferences. Citizens’ self-interest does 
matter when it comes to deciding which political party to support, but it only matters 
among very specific subsets of the population: Those who perceive that they are 
dissimilar from the recipients of the largesse bestowed by the parties of the left. It appears 
that citizens who perceive that they share similarities with welfare beneficiaries support 
parties of the left, as these are the parties that favor redistribution.  
 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is important to note that the 
relationships presented in this chapter may arise due to the presence of an unobserved 
variable—it is not impossible that individuals support parties of the left and perceive that 
they are closer to the poor, not because feeling close to the poor causes them to support 
	  	   86	  
left-leaning parties, but because some third variable induces both left-leaning political 
views and identification with the poor.  
 The same could be true for right-leaning political views and perceptions of 
dissimilarity with welfare beneficiaries. This hypothetical unobserved variable could 
conceivably influence the effect of self-interest, as well. What the evidence in this 
chapter suggests, however, is that the relationship between self-interest and partisanship 
changes in line with citizens’ group identification with those lowest on society’s socio-
economic ladder.  
 This contribution to the literature on economic voting has implications for 
strategies parties could use to attract support. Based on the evidence at hand, it appears 
that the key to winning wealthier voters’ support for left parties is by making salient, or 
developing, a shared identification with the poor. The rich will support redistribution—
and by extension, parties of the left—not because of their limited self-interest, but rather 
out of a sense of obligation for those in need.  
 This may be a significant point, insofar as it suggests that parties of the left should 
forego great effort attempting to convince wealthier voters that redistribution is in their 
economic self-interest. The rich realize that they will never require recourse to forms of 
welfare assistance designed to mitigate the effects of poverty, and as such, it will very 
rarely ever be the case that the wealthy find self-interested reasons (defined narrowly, in 
accordance with the definition provided in the second chapter) to support welfare 
redistribution from the rich to the poor.  
 Furthermore, the evidence presented in earlier chapters suggests that the 
redistributive attitudes of those who already identify with the poor are unlikely to be 
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swayed by appeals to their self-interest. Where and when parties of the left can highlight 
the similarities of the haves and the have-nots, they should find it easier to foment 
support for themselves and, relatedly and importantly, for redistributive programs that 
benefit the poor. Conversely, where and when parties of the right are able to highlight the 
differences splitting the haves from the have-nots, self-interest will spur the wealthy to 
oppose redistribution and support the right.  
 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 5.1 Labour or Conservative? BSAS 2009    
    Model      
Intercept   1.83* 
Dissimilar  -0.24*  
Poor    0.05 
Dissimilar * Poor   0.01 
Age   -0.22*** 
Sex   -0.11 
n    469      
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
Education fixed-effects (HEdQual) not shown; Poor is inverse of Income; 
  
Table 5.2 Labour/Liberal Democrat or Conservative? BSAS 2009  
    Model      
Intercept   3.01*** 
Dissimilar  -0.34*** 
Poor   -0.02 
Dissimilar * Poor   0.02* 
Age    0.17 
Sex   -0.12 
n    586      
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
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Table 5.3 Partisanship in US, ANES1996    
    Model     
Intercept   5.17*** 
Dissimilar  -1.61*** 
Poor   -0.01 
Dissimilar * Poor   0.07* 
Age   -0.04 
Male   -0.34** 
n    1,189  
adj. R2    0.07        
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
Education fixed-effects (V960610) not shown. Poor is inverse of Income; 
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 This study has sought to contribute to a wide and ever-growing body of work that 
probes the bases of public support for welfare redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
While many existing studies narrow their focus to measure the importance of a single 
variable, or at most a set of single variables, the previous chapters have demonstrated 
how some of the major factors these extant studies have identified work together. In 
summation, the effects of at least two of the leading explanations or predictors of 
citizens’ redistributive attitudes are conditional upon citizens’ perceptions of similarity 
with welfare recipients.  
 As theorists whose pedigree stretches back to Hobbes believe, self-interest 
matters. The classical story stipulates that the rich oppose redistribution to the poor in 
order to protect their interests, and the poor support redistribution in order to further 
theirs. But this self-interested story is only of limited value. While it is certainly true that 
some—maybe even many—rich people oppose redistribution, it is also apparent that a 
fair number of them do not. In fact, working at the opposite end of the theoretical 
spectrum, researchers argue that feelings of empathy and altruism operate to induce 
favorability toward redistribution. Although few scholars would deny that a multitude of 
considerations explain people’s attitudes about welfare, fewer have explored how it is 
possible that two starkly opposing and mutually exclusive factors function 
simultaneously across a population to mold attitudes.  
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 This study offered a first-jab at the issue by showing that the effects of self-
interest and/or empathy on people’s redistributive attitudes is a function of people’s 
perceived similarities with those in need. I theorized and demonstrated empirically that 
self-interest matters in the absence of perceived similarities, whereas empathy matters 
only in similarity’s presence. These findings are important for a variety of reasons. At the 
most basic level, this study has helped organize a growing and disjointed literature. As 
research on important scholarly and policy questions accumulates, researchers are often 
left with an unwieldy litany of explanatory factors, with new additions being added and 
little work being done to systematize the various factors beyond efforts to advocate for 
the r-squared of one over the others. This study purposefully has not wadded into an 
attempt to test whether self-interest, empathy, or group identity explains most variance in 
people’s redistributive attitudes. Reams of studies demonstrate that each factor matters, 
and it has been the goal of this study to explicate when, or among whom, these various 
factors are important in explaining attitudes.  
 One key point of this study is that perceptions matter—in particular, people’s 
perceptions of their social distance to others is key in determining their attitudes, and the 
effect of other concerns on these attitudes, about redistribution. These perceptions of 
similarity hold societies together, but only precariously so. When it comes to the rich and 
the poor, perceptions of similarities may be scarce. Theoretically, this is likely less true in 
more equal societies than less equal ones. In more equal societies, the rich and the poor 
are more similar definitionally, but as inequality increases, so too do social markers of 
socioeconomic status (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). The rich and the poor wear different 
types of clothes, live in different neighborhoods, go to different schools, shop in different 
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grocery stores, go to different churches—in other words, live in separate worlds hardly 
conducive to forging cross-group perceptions of similarities.  
 The perceived differences between the rich and the poor are further compounded 
in some societies where socio-economic status overlaps with racial, ethnic, and other 
divisions. In the United States, this division is most evident between whites and people of 
color. This division’s effect on redistributive attitudes (Gilens 1999; Luttmer 2001) and 
redistributive spending (Alesina & Glaeser 2004) is well documented. In a number of 
European countries, the socio-economic divide is increasingly associated with the divide 
between native Europeans and members of recent (and not-so-recent) immigrant groups, 
which research has documented appears to influence public opinion about welfare 
spending (Eger 2010).  
 Importantly, none of this is meant to imply that increasing diversity automatically 
diminishes support for welfare. On the contrary, the evidence presented throughout this 
study confirms that a fair number of whites perceive similarities with African Americans 
and, for example, many native British citizens believe that they share a great deal in 
common with immigrants. For supporters of the welfare state, the key is not in limiting 
diversity, but rather in increasing the perception that members of the majority share 
commonalities with minorities. This, naturally, is far easier said than done—and 
identifying methods for fomenting perceptions of similarity fall beyond the purview of 
this study—but the task is far from impossible.  
 Indeed, the psychological social identity literature that inspired political scientists 
to pinpoint the correlation between outgroup prejudices and decreased support for 
redistribution prompted other researchers to study the conditions under which 
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individuals’ perceptions of the ingroup expand to include members of former outgroups. 
For instance, in his 2007 study, Transue builds on the insights from the common ingroup 
identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio 2004) to show how making a non-racialized 
American identity salient in a survey-experiment setting dilutes the distinction between 
whites and blacks, resulting in higher favorability of welfare spending. Additional, more 
practical work must be undertaken in order to explore how real-world interventions can 
accomplish similar outcomes. 
 In addition to the relationship between group identification, self-interest, empathy 
and support for welfare redistribution, in Chapter Five, I demonstrated that perceptions of 
similarities condition self-interest’s influence on partisanship more generally. This 
finding further underlines the precariousness of theorizing that a single factor has a 
uniform effect across a wide, diverse population. Although self-interest is important in 
politics, this study has shown that it is not important to everyone. Namely, among people 
who perceive that they share commonalities with the poor, self-interest explains little 
about preferences for redistribution and, by extension, little about partisan support.  
 The arguments and evidence presented in this study have additional implications 
on existing ways of thinking and that illuminate paths for future work. For instance, the 
theory of perceptions of similarity’s conditioning effect on self-interest and empathy 
presented in this study refine and contribute to theories of moral parochialism—i.e. the 
philosophical argument that individuals prefer to provide assistance to fellow countrymen 
before assisting others. Theorists have previously argued that individuals restrict their 
assistance to compatriots out of a psychological necessity to sub-categorize the 
population; that doing so is the most efficient method of addressing need; because doing 
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so fulfills other needs, such as group solidarity; or that the restriction of help to 
compatriots is borne out of reciprocal obligations among group members (see Dagger 
1985 for an overview of these arguments). I would wager that, where moral parochialism 
exists, it in part results because the psychological triggers (e.g. empathy) that are 
conducive to individuals providing assistance to others are more likely to be activated 
when the others in question are more similar, as opposed to more different, to the 
individual.  
   Furthermore, I believe the framework in this study can be expanded to explain 
possible variances in the effects that other established factors exert on public support for 
welfare redistribution. For example, values also should be incorporated into this 
framework. Just as perceptions of commonality encourage altruism by creating 
communal space in which promises of reciprocation and/or a sense of shared humanity 
flourish, a sense of community also provides the space for the emergence and expression 
of values, such as egalitarianism and humanistic values. Feelings of community provide 
the boundaries egalitarians and humanitarians are likely to use as constraints either due to 
the scarcity of resources or because communities and values overlap.  
 Even the most socially-minded egalitarian recognizes that limited resources 
constrain the scope of redistribution—an argument that ties into moral parochialism, as 
discussed above. This hypothetical egalitarian might believe that all people should enjoy 
a relatively equal standard of living, but given scarce resources, he is still more likely to 
apply these egalitarian principles to his own ingroup first.17 Future research into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It is possible, of course, that people who hold egalitarian and/or humanitarian values 
perceive fewer distinctions between themselves and most other human beings relative to 
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effects of values on public opinion should explore how perceptions of similarity—
perceptions of community, in other words—demarcate the boundaries of egalitarianism 
and humanism.18  
 
The Bigger Picture 
 
 Self-interest is not the bedrock upon which politics of redistribution is built. 
Instead, support for redistribution is intimately entangled with group identities, or more 
specifically with perceptions of commonality, that influence attitudes both directly and 
indirectly. The importance of community and perceptions of community in politics has 
been documented by others (Wong 2010; Walsh 2012), and this study has sought to 
contribute by exploring in more depth how these perceptions condition the political role 
of other factors—namely, self-interest and empathy.  
 Perceptions of commonality have the ability to mitigate the power of raw self-
interest and to open up space for the emergence of altruistic actions spurred by 
empathetic emotions and thought processes. That these perceptions can and do change 
both overtime and within individuals (as demonstrated by the experiments in this study) 
further underlines the malleability of self-interest and empathy’s influence in politics. It 
is quite conceivable that a politics built on empathy and altruism could craft sustainable 
welfare policies in contexts where citizens’ perceptions of commonality vis-à-vis the 
poorest members of society are strengthened. Unfortunately, in today’s political climate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
those who do not have these values. Exploring how, or if, values overlap with people’s 
perceptions of others offers yet another possible avenue for future research. 
18 At present, to the best of my knowledge no available public opinion dataset includes 
relevant measures of values, perceptions of commonality, and redistributive attitudes.  
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both in the United States and in Europe, where traditional demographic majorities are 
losing their hegemony to immigrant newcomers, elites and parties of the right have ample 
opportunity to stoke xenophobic fears, which undermine empathy’s relevance and, in 
turn, increase the power of self-interest.   
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